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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Concern about climate change and other environmental impacts of 
traditional power generating sources (e.g., natural gas, coal, nuclear, and 
hydropower) have led both states and the federal government to adopt 
aggressive policies over the last decade to promote the development of 
renewable sources of electric generation.  These generating sources include 
wind, solar, geothermal, biomass, small hydro, and landfill gas, among 
others.  President Obama has called for a Clean Energy Standard (CES)1 
that would double the fraction of America’s generation from less carbon-
intensive generating sources, as well as the 2009 American Recovery 
 1. President Obama called for a national Clean Energy Standard (CES) to meet 
80% of the nation’s energy demands through “clean” energy sources in his state of the union 
speeches in 2011 and 2012.  Obama’s CES would define qualifying “clean” energy 
sources different than most state renewable energy standards, however.  Nat Keohane, A 
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and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) that expanded both tax incentives for 
project development and federal investments or loan guarantees for 
renewable technologies.2  Former Interior Secretary Ken Salazar also 
promoted accelerated renewable project development on federal lands 
under the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct)3 and ARRA by developing 
a “fast-track” process to permit projects under the tight ARRA timelines.4  
Congress has failed to adopt comprehensive climate legislation, but the 
Executive branch has taken its existing authority and expansively used it 
to act where Congress has not.5 
The states have also been aggressive in promoting renewable energy, 
most significantly by adopting Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs) 
that call for a specified fraction of each electric utility’s annual demand 
to be met from a specified set of renewable generating sources.6  Each 
state has its own RPS target and qualifying criteria, but California has 
been the most aggressive. The California RPS has driven renewables 
development—and increased pressure to build the transmission lines 
necessary to move that power from resource-rich regions to the demand 
centers in California—throughout the West.  The California RPS standard, 
which was originally set at 20% by 2020 in 20027 and then expanded to 
 2. See generally American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 42 U.S.C.   
§ 16516(a) (Supp. III 2009). 
 3. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified in scattered 
sections of 26 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
 4. Siobhan McIntyre & Timothy P. Duane, Water, Work, Wildlife, and Wilderness: 
The Collaborative Federal Public Lands Planning Framework for Utility-Scale Solar 
Energy Development in the Desert Southwest, 41 ENVTL. L. 1093 (2011). 
 5. The Supreme Court determined that carbon dioxide is a “pollutant” under the 
Clean Air Act (CAA) in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), leading the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to make a required endangerment finding under 
the CAA in 2009.  Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse 
Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,497 (Dec. 15, 
2009).  The EPA then adopted a series of regulations on carbon dioxide that have been 
upheld by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. 
EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 120 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 6. The outstanding “Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency,” 
developed and maintained by the North Carolina Solar Center for the U.S. Department of 
Energy, offers a series of tables and maps summarizing a wide array of state-level programs.  
For a list of the states and utilities with RPS targets see U.S. Dept. of Energy, Rules, 
Regulations & Policies for Renewable Energy, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR 
RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY col. 2 (RPS), http://www.dsireusa.org/summarytables/rrpre. 
cfm (last visited Dec. 20, 2012). 
 7. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.11(a) (West 2004). 
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33% by Executive Order in 2008,8 was expanded statutorily to 33% of 
California’s annual electricity demand by 2020 with the passage of SB 
2(1x) in 2011.9  The new RPS requirements now apply to municipal 
utilities like the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP).  
California’s RPS and the state’s implementation of the California Global 
Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB 32) through a cap-and-trade emissions 
standard are reordering the generation resource mix throughout the 
West. 
The result has been a dramatic increase in renewables and a policy debate 
over how best to integrate the variable generation output of renewables 
into the existing grid.  The California Independent System Operator 
(CAISO), which operates the California grid, estimates that 2,500 
megawatts (MW) of new renewable generation will come on-line in 
2012 alone—nearly doubling the total of 2,871 MW that was added to 
the grid from 2003-2011.  The slope of the increase is also growing, with 
15-20 GW expected to be added by 2020.10  California policy-makers 
have also indicated that they may further increase the RPS goal to 40% of 
California’s power from renewables by 2025.11 
The Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) has also experienced 
exponential increases in renewable generation, going from 250 MW in 
June 2005 to 2,500 MW by December 2009 and then up to 4,711 MW 
by May 2012.12  Wind generation on the BPA system actually exceeded 
 8. Cal. Exec. Order S-14-08 (Nov. 17, 2008), available at http://gov.ca.gov/news. 
php?id=11072.  For a summary of the history of California’s RPS see McIntyre & Duane, 
supra note 4, at 1102–03. 
 9. S.B. 2, 2011-2012, Reg. Sess. §§ 1, 4 (Cal. 2011), available at http://leginfo. 
ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_0001-0050/sbx1_2_bill_20110412_chaptered.pdf.  The bill 
was introduced February 1, 2011; passed the Senate on February 25, 2011; passed the 
Assembly on March 15, 2011; and was signed into law by Governor Brown on April 12, 
2011.  Cal. Legislative Counsel, Complete Bill History: S.B. No. 2 (1st Ex. Sess.), 
OFFICIAL CAL. LEGISLATIVE INFO., http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_0001-
0050/ sbx1_2_bill_20110412_history.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2011). 
 10. Mark Rothleder, CAISO Executive Director, Market Analysis and Development, 
Presentation to the Environmental Law Conference at Yosemite (Oct. 27, 2012). 
 11. See Mark Z. Jacobson & Mark A. Delucchi, A Path To Sustainable Energy by 
2030, SCI. AM., Nov. 2009.  California Governor Jerry Brown has stated that “while 
reaching a 33% renewables portfolio standard will be an important milestone, it is really 
just a starting point—a floor, not a ceiling.  Our state has enormous renewable resource 
potential.  I would like to see us pursue even more far-reaching targets.  With the amount 
of renewable resources coming on-line, and prices dropping, I think 40%, at reasonable 
cost, is well within our grasp in the near future,” in his SB 2 (1x) signing statement on 
April 12, 2011.  Letter from Jerry Brown, Governor, Cal., to Members of the Cal. State 
S. (Apr. 12, 2011), available at http://gov.ca.gov/docs/SBX1_0002_Signing_Message.pdf. 
 12. Bonneville Power Admin., Wind Generation Capacity in the BPA Balancing 
Authority Area, BPA–TRANSMISSION SERV., http://transmission.bpa.gov/business/operations/ 
wind/WIND_InstalledCapacity_Plot.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2012). 
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hydro generation for the first time in October 2012.13  The majority of 
the wind generation in BPA’s balancing authority area (BA) produces 
power for sale to California and much of it is generated during times of 
high hydropower production within the BPA BA.  Managing the 
transmission demands of wind in the BPA BA for export to California 
has therefore become a challenge that has erupted in legal conflicts 
between BPA and wind generators before the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC).  These types of conflicts will likely become more 
prevalent unless significant policy changes and new institutional 
innovations address the sources of these conflicts. 
Policy conflicts before FERC over renewables integration led the 
Commission to adopt Order No. 764 on the Integration of Variable 
Energy Resources (VER) in June 2012, to take effect in June 2013.14  
The BPA wind dispute continues, however, and CAISO anticipates 
similar conflicts on its system in the future due to a variety of other 
factors affecting the existing generation mix.  Understanding the sources 
of conflict in the BPA wind dispute—as well as the limits of FERC’s 
Order No. 764 to address the underlying causes of the conflict—is therefore 
essential to develop effective policies and institutional innovation to reduce 
such conflict.  Some observers argue for even higher levels of renewable 
generation in the resource mix in order to meet climate change mitigation 
goals, and some European countries have already adopted policies to 
make such a transition to a renewables-dominated generating system.15  
We will not achieve a robust, reliable, and resilient electrical system with 
high levels of renewable generation unless we address the institutional 
impediments to integration. 
This Article addresses the legal, technical, and economic challenges of 
integrating high levels of renewable power generation into electrical grid 
system operation.  Part II shows that the primary integration challenge is 
 13. Associated Press, Wind power briefly exceeds NW hydro power, MAIL TRIBUNE 
(Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.mailtribune.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20121025/BIZ/210 
250319. 
 14. Integration of Variable Energy Resources, 141 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,246 (June 22, 
2012) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35); see also News Release, Fed. Energy Regulatory 
Comm’n, FERC Approves Final Rule to Integrate Variable Energy Resources, (June 21, 
2012), available at http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/ 2012/2012-2/06-21-12-E-3.asp. 
See generally FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, INTEGRATION OF VARIABLE ENERGY 
RESOURCES, Docket No. RM10-11-000, 139 FERC 61246 (2012). 
 15. Lesley McAllister, Overallocation and Reform in the EU ETS, ENVIRONMENTAL 
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reducing the total costs of integration and allocating the costs of integration 
in a hybrid regulatory structure, which presents different institutional 
impediments than traditional cost-of-service ratemaking or rate-of-return 
regulation.  We demonstrate that the primary impediment to improved 
integration is a failure to make the critical policy choice about how such 
costs will be allocated.  Part III describes and analyzes the BPA-wind 
dispute in order to evaluate the adequacy of the existing legal regime to 
address this policy issue.  Part IV describes and analyzes a suite of strategies 
proposed by the Western Governors’ Association (WGA) to reduce the 
cost of integrating renewable generation.  Finally, Part V demonstrates 
that FERC Order No. 764 is only a first step toward improved integration 
because it does not address the fundamental policy decision regarding 
the distribution of integration costs and methods for cost recovery.  We 
then offer recommendations for action by FERC, state regulators, state 
legislatures, and Congress to promote improved integration of renewable 
generation. 
Throughout the Article, we distinguish between four distinct (but 
interrelated) integration problems: (1) the technical challenges of integrating 
variability; (2) the economic costs of integrating variability; (3) the policy 
choice regarding distribution of integration costs; and (4) the legal 
framework for implementing that policy.  Proper analysis of the technical, 
economic, and legal issues depends on the critical policy choice regarding 
cost allocation.  Resolution of the cost allocation policy decision is therefore 
essential to development of a new institutional structure that will promote 
high levels of renewable generation. 
II.   THE CHALLENGE OF COST ALLOCATION IN A HYBRID           
REGULATORY STRUCTURE 
A.  The Integration of Variable Generating Resources is                             
Not a New Problem 
The electric utility industry has faced the challenge of variable resource 
integration since its inception: both demand and supply sources vary 
over time and with uncertainty, so maintaining system reliability has 
always required both technical modifications to the electrical grid as 
well as economic expenditures to maintain overall grid reliability.  All 
electrical generating resources are variable, intermittent, uncertain, or 
unpredictable to some degree: renewables differ primarily in the temporal 
scale of their output variability.  But every new power plant, transmission 
line, or load—regardless of generation type—affects power system 
operations and therefore requires integration through technical modifications 
6 
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with economic consequences by altering how other resources in the 
portfolio are operated. 
We do not mean to suggest by this, however, that integration is not a 
significant challenge.  The specific characteristics of variability, intermittency, 
and uncertainty associated with the generating output of modern renewable 
generation technologies present a significant technical challenge to maintain 
system reliability.  Moreover, the economic costs of integration may be 
significant with high levels of penetration by renewables as a fraction of 
the generating resource mix.  But it is instructive to consider how the 
variability, intermittency, and uncertainty associated with traditional 
generating technologies (i.e., those that do not generally qualify under 
state RPS mandates today) have been dealt with historically in order to 
determine how best to address the modern challenge of integrating 
renewables into a reliable grid.  We shall demonstrate here that variability, 
intermittency, and uncertainty are inherent characteristics of the electrical 
grid and that the primary impediment to renewables integration is one of 
cost allocation. 
Consider an ideal case: The exact same level of demand is maintained 
for all hours of the year (regardless of weather, day of the week, or time 
of day) and that demand is met by a single generator that has 100% 
reliable output to precisely match the demand level.  Both demand and 
supply are invariable in this ideal example.  But this ideal quickly turns 
into a case of variable generation as soon as the presumption of 100% 
reliability is altered.  Even with 99% reliability, the generator’s output is 
now variable.  Moreover, the fact that the generator is sized to exactly 
match the demand means that all of the load must be shed (i.e., must lose 
power) during the one percent of the time (i.e., 87.6 hours per year) that 
the generator is unavailable.  This level of lost power would be nearly 
forty times more hours than the industry standard, which is for a loss of 
load probability (LOLP) of just one day in ten years (2.4 hours per 
year).16  Utility planners, therefore, strive to provide reliable power for 
87,576 out of every 87,600 hours—whether the outage is caused by the 
failure of a generator, a downed transmission line, or problems with the 
distribution system. 
The system planner can improve reliability by building more, smaller 
units.  Assume that the overall demand is 1000 MW in our example and 
 16. See EDWARD KAHN, ELECTRIC UTILITY PLANNING & REGULATION (Am. Council 
for an Energy-Efficient Economy, 1988). 
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that the least-cost power plant (ignoring the consequences of it being out 
of service for either routine maintenance or a forced outage) is a single 
1000 MW plant that produces power at 10.0 cents per kilowatt-hour 
(kWh).  Assume that a 500 MW plant costs 10% more per kWh than a 
1000 MW plant, a 250 MW plant costs another 10% more, and a 100 
MW plant costs 10% more still.  The cost of outages is real and significant, 
so the system planner wants to reduce the likelihood of any one 
customer losing power to only nine hours per year (i.e., to just one-tenth 
the current likelihood, but still nearly four times the industry reliability 
target).  The system planner will therefore invest in higher-cost resources 
in order to reduce total system costs—including customers’ costs of 
outages—by building several smaller plants rather than the single large 
plant.  Moreover, the system planner will overbuild capacity to improve 
reliability.  The resulting portfolio of generators may include one 500 
MW plant, a 250 MW plant, and four 100 MW plants (for a total of 1150 
MW of capacity, allowing a 15% “reserve margin” over demand).  Some 
customers will still lose power when a plant goes out, but rolling blackouts 
can minimize the impact.  The total cost of such a generation mix would 
be about 26% higher than if only the single, “least cost” 1000 MW 
generator had been built.  But customers are willing to pay a premium of 
12.6 cents per kWh rather than 10.0 cents per kWh for the benefit of 
reliability. 
We can extend the example further by accounting for the risk of 
transmission outages.  Assuming that the generators are not distributed 
among the customers directly at the site of customer load, the power 
must be transmitted from the generators to customers.  Having all the 
power transmitted on the same transmission line would expose the entire 
system to an outage risk due to storms, technical failures, or even 
sabotage.  Therefore, the system planner will choose to locate the power 
plants in different locations in order to geographically diversify that 
vulnerability.  This may also increase system costs, by way of more, 
smaller, and less efficient transmission lines, as well as reduced economies 
of scale related to the common needs of the power plants (e.g., natural 
gas supply pipelines, access to coal mines).  Once again, those higher 
system integration costs are worth it for reliability. 
But this analysis has focused only on the supply side of the equation; 
let us make customer demand a bit more realistic.  Now assume that 
demand varies dramatically annually, by day of the week and by hour of 
the day—but such variation is not perfectly predictable and reacts in 
response to weather conditions, the shopping season, and whether or not 
the Super Bowl is on TV on a given day.  Moreover, let’s assume there 
are just ten customers: a 500 MW peak-demand customer, a 200 MW 
customer, two 100 MW customers, four 50 MW customers, and two 25 
8 
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MW customers.  That adds up to a potential peak demand of 1150 MW, 
but the customers do not all demand their peak demand at the same time. 
Therefore, the peak demand for the overall system is only 1000 MW on 
the hottest days.  The diversity of customer loads works to the advantage 
of the system planner in the same way that geographic diversity reduces 
the risk of outages.  The planner need not build as many power plants as 
would be necessary to meet the sum total of each customer’s demand.  
But the timing of customer additions would affect how the system 
planner could best achieve a least-cost resource mix that meets reliability 
standards. 
The particular combination of customer demand presents an even more 
complex problem for planning, however, and it may require the system 
planner to diversify the generation mix even further.  This is because 
overall system demand now has the potential to vary even more 
dramatically: as one customer turns the power off, another may turn it 
on—but, when the first turns it back on, the overall demand may suddenly 
go up.  The system planner now needs generators that can vary their 
output to match the load.  The generation mix will therefore be altered 
further to include different types of power plants.  Some will be “baseload” 
(operating all the time; typically the lowest-cost power plants), while 
others will have more flexibility to vary output with changing customer 
loads (at a higher cost per unit of output).  This variability in customer 
demand imposes a significant integration cost on the system.  Moreover, 
the cost of such integration will be greatest for those customers that vary 
their load the most compared to the pattern of variation in the overall 
system load.  Conversely, the cost of integrating customers whose 
demand co-varies negatively with variation in the overall system load 
may actually be negative (i.e., total system costs are reduced by having 
them as customers). 
Several important principles emerge from this relatively simple example.  
First, the timing of when a resource is added to the system affects how 
one calculates both the benefits and the costs of that resource.  Second, 
integration of multiple resources increases system costs but also generally 
increases reliability by reducing the system’s vulnerability to the loss of 
any single generator.  Third, both generators and customers impose 
integration costs on the system—and those integration costs may actually 
be negative if the generators or the load vary their output and demand so 
as to allow more efficient generators to meet the system load when it 
would otherwise be vulnerable to disruption.  Finally, geographic diversity 
 9 
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in both loads and resources can reduce overall system costs.  Larger 
utilities with more diverse loads and generating resources will generally 
be able to meet demand more reliably for less cost than smaller utilities 
without such diversity.  This is known as the portfolio effect.  The value 
or cost of each additional generator or load is a function of how that 
generator or load co-varies with the system portfolio’s costs; the individual 
generator or load’s variability is not the most important determinant of 
cost.17  Equally important, blanket statements about the cost (or benefits) 
of variability are generally unreliable: the cost or benefit of a given 
generator or customer’s variability depends on the characteristics of the 
specific resource mix and customer demand patterns for a given balancing 
area. 
The real world of utility planning today is infinitely more complex 
than our simple example, which is based on a system where there is a 
central system planner rather than a set of market mechanisms to induce 
behavior by generators and customers—and which involves very few 
generators and customers operating over very coarse time scales.18  The 
technical complexity alone of the modern electric grid requires the 
simultaneous, instantaneous satisfaction of millions of customers’ demand 
across thousands of miles of geography from hundreds of generating 
sources over thousands of miles of transmission lines and tens of thousands 
of miles of distribution lines.  Given its complexity, it is a marvel of 
modern engineering brilliance that the electrical system does not go down 
every day.19 
That complexity also means it is extremely difficult to calculate the 
true cost or value of integrating a given generating resource or customer 
into the electrical grid. And when it is difficult to calculate something, 
there will likely be a lot of different technical rationales for calculating it 
a particular way—usually in a way that will push the costs of integration 
onto a party other than the party proposing a particular method of 
calculating those costs of integration.  Thus it is not surprising that 
integration cost estimates vary widely and that the basis for calculating 
those costs is a highly contested subject today. Yet, there was no dispute 
 17. Timothy P. Duane, The Risk-Adjusted Cost Evaluation of Electric Resource 
Alternatives (June 1989) (Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University) (on file with author). 
 18. See KAHN, supra note 16. 
 19. Electricity has different technological characteristics than other complex technical 
systems like air transportation.  David Marcus has said that it would be comparable to having 
a deregulated airline system where, any time a flight was delayed for a single minute, 
every other airplane flying at the time of the delay would simultaneously drop out of the 
sky.  Timothy P. Duane, Regulation’s Rationale: Learning from the California Energy 
Crisis, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 471, 490 (2002). 
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about how to calculate integration costs under cost-of-service ratemaking 
and the rate-of-return regulatory structure. 
B.  Historic Cost-of-Service Regulatory Structure Internalized                 
Costs of Integration 
How did we as a society overcome the problem of integration?  How 
did we manage to develop a grid with the proper mix of generating 
resource diversity, operating flexibility, aggregate demand diversity, and 
overall costs that are low enough to continually fuel growth in electricity 
demand that is disproportional to overall energy demand growth?  What 
were the institutional arrangements that allowed the system to be built? 
The answer, until the past fifteen years or so, was cost-of-service 
ratemaking or rate-of-return regulation based upon cost-of-service.  
Integration costs were internalized through the structure of vertical 
electric utility integration (i.e., generation, transmission, and distribution 
provided by a single entity with a geographic monopoly and obligation 
to provide service to all customers within a geographic area).  The 
integration costs were recovered from all ratepayers either through rate-
of-return regulation by a state regulatory commission (based on the cost-
of-service) or passing cost-of-service through to customers via public 
utilities.20  It is therefore instructive to review how that system addressed 
integration costs before renewables generated the recent controversy 
over such costs. 
As we have suggested above, electrical utilities have traditionally planned 
for and invested in generation and transmission resources based upon 
two primary principles and therefore evaluative criteria: (1) to maintain 
system reliability in order to have no more than a specified likelihood of 
outages for individual customers, and (2) to minimize the total system 
cost to achieve that level of reliability.  Under cost-of-service ratemaking or 
rate-of-return regulation, the utility would allocate the total system costs 
across all of its ratepayers based on some combination of fixed charges 
(e.g., a monthly bill tied to some fixed set of costs that need to be 
recovered from ratepayers) and variable charges (e.g., based upon the 
amount of kWh consumed in a given month).  Moreover, the variable charge 
typically increases as a function of consumption levels.  For example, 
 20. See RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION 
AND RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM (1999); see generally 
KAHN, supra note 16; Duane, supra note 19. 
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there is a “block” of usage at a relatively low rate, then another block at 
a higher rate, and then additional blocks at even higher rates.  The reason 
for this increasing block rate system is that higher demand generally 
requires higher-cost resources to be dispatched—typically infrequently—in 
order to meet all of the demand.  Finally, there are sometimes cross-class 
subsidies among different classes of ratepayers (e.g., commercial and 
industrial customers may subsidize residential customers).  These cross-
class subsidies persist for two very different reasons: (1) universal access 
to electrical service is an important public policy goal,21 and (2) the 
politics of increasing residential rates make it very difficult to charge 
residential customers the full cost of serving their demand.  Residential 
customers vote and public utilities commissions are appointed by the 
Governor of a given state, so most commissioners are politically sensitive. 
There are several important features to note under this traditional 
system.  First, when determining whether or not to add a generating 
resource, the critical question is simply whether or not the total system 
costs are lower with that incremental addition compared to any alternative 
addition of a different generation or transmission resource.  This means 
that the integration costs associated with the new generating resource are 
never calculated; instead, they are presumed to be system costs if the 
resource is the least-cost addition.  Second, the impact of a new customer’s 
demand (or the variability in a customer’s demand) on total system costs 
is never calculated and that customer is never directly charged for any 
increases in system costs (nor is the customer credited for any decreases 
in system costs).  Instead, all customers bear the increased costs of any 
changes in load—be it due to the addition of new customers or through 
changes in existing customers’ loads.  Rates may indirectly be higher for 
the new customer if that customer consumes a lot of electricity, but those 
higher rates will also be borne by all of the existing customers. 
Utilities nevertheless worry about these integration costs, which could 
significantly increase total system costs and, therefore, rates, if they get 
too high.  Moreover, utilities indirectly account for the integration costs 
when calculating the total system costs of various possible resource 
additions: if one relatively low-cost generating resource imposes high 
integration costs on the system, another higher-cost generating resource 
(or transmission investment) with lower integration costs may lead to 
lower total system costs.  In such cases, the latter (low integration cost) 
resource will be added to the resource mix ahead of the former (high 
 21. Federal establishment of the Rural Electrification Administration and Tennessee 
Valley Authority—along with the Western Area Power Administration and Bonneville 
Power Administration to market low-cost hydropower from federal projects at preferential 
rates to publicly-owned utilities—reflect this policy goal. 
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integration cost) resource.  Notably, though, the analysis always focuses 
on the impact of a resource on the total system costs—rather than the 
integration costs of an individual generating resource per se.  The reason 
is that utilities recover their total system costs (including, for investor-
owned utilities subject to state rate-of-return regulation, a reasonable rate 
of return on invested capital) regardless of a given resource’s or customer’s 
integration costs.  Integration costs are just another cost of doing business 
that can be passed through to customers. 
Some traditional non-renewable generating resources have imposed 
significant integration costs, and utilities have dealt with them by making 
co-investments in either other generating resources or transmission 
resources to reduce total system costs.  The Diablo Canyon nuclear power 
plant is an illustrative example.  Because  the addition of Diablo Canyon 
alone would result in significant “overgeneration” during most off-peak 
periods and cause significant operational problems in the transmission 
system, Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E) built the Helms Pumped 
Storage hydroelectric project to complement Diablo Canyon. Helms then 
used Diablo Canyon’s “excess” generation during off-peak periods to 
pump water back uphill from Wishon reservoir to Courtright reservoir.  
Net generation from the Helms plant was negative, meaning that it took 
more power to pump the water uphill than was generated by the plant on 
a daily and annual basis.  But the “cost” of the electricity used to pump 
the water uphill was actually negative, because it reduced Diablo Canyon’s 
integration costs. The pumped storage hydro could then run downhill 
again during peak periods to produce higher-value power when Diablo 
Canyon could not increase its own output.  Neither Diablo Canyon nor 
Helms was as cost-effective alone as they were together; when considered 
as a package, their complementary profiles reduced integration costs. 
Such complementary relationships between resources depend upon the 
particular demand patterns (both temporally and spatially), generating 
resource mix profile (including the likelihood and magnitude of generating 
unit outages), and cost structure of the individual utility in question (e.g., 
high fixed costs versus high variable fuel costs).  As noted above, the 
benefits of aggregation and diversification across both loads and generating 
resources have generally led to larger utilities in order to reduce the total 
system costs of maintaining desired reliability.  But even these larger 
utilities could be more reliable or reduce their total system costs by 
contracting for some power with other utilities, so significant transmission 
 13 
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investments have been made to link utilities to take advantage of greater 
diversity. 
California and the Pacific Northwest are an excellent example.  California 
utilities have historically been summer-peaking, primarily due to air 
conditioning and irrigation pumping in the hotter California climate, 
while Pacific Northwest utilities historically had winter peak demand 
due to the extensive penetration of electric heating, which was much 
greater in the region due to the relatively low cost of federal hydropower.22  
Moreover, California’s generating system was capacity constrained but 
it had the ability to produce a great deal of energy during the winter 
without threatening its ability to meet peak demands during the summer.  
In contrast, the Pacific Northwest’s system was energy constrained, 
because it could produce only as much power as the total amount of 
water behind its system of dams. Capacity was less of an issue for the 
Pacific Northwest, which could generate capacity in the summer to help 
meet California’s peak demand—in exchange for California providing 
energy in the winter.  It was a match made in generation planning heaven, 
so the California and Pacific Northwest utilities invested in significant 
transmission systems to allow the exchanges to take place.23  Each 
region, and each individual utility involved in the trade, was able to reduce 
its total system costs by investing in transmission and contracting to buy 
power from others rather than building and operating more of its own 
generation. 
Each utility was also able to recover the costs of its investments in 
transmission based on the security of cost-of-service ratemaking or rate-
of-return regulation.  The investor-owned utilities simply had to show 
their respective state public utilities commissions that those investments 
were prudent (i.e., resulted in lower total system costs compared to the 
alternatives); the public utilities had to convince the voters who elected 
them that there was no less expensive alternative that would maintain 
reliability.  The latter was easier for California’s municipal utilities than 
many of the public utilities in the Pacific Northwest, however, because 
most modern investments in either generation or transmission have 
 22. See Jolanka V. Fisher & Timothy P. Duane, Trends in Electricity Consumption, 
Peak Demand, and Generating Capacity in California and the Western Grid 2 (Univ. of 
Cal. Energy Inst., Working Paper No. PWP-085, 2001), available at http://www.ucei. 
berkeley.edu/PDF/pwp085.pdf. 
 23. Design of those transmission resources therefore also reflected the particular 
needs of the two regions and the timing of when they each found it advantageous to 
exchange power for energy—which is a different set of operating conditions than those 
transmission lines are now expected to meet.  Not surprisingly, then, the transmission 
system design and investment that would optimize the export of wind power to California 
would be different. 
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increased overall costs more significantly compared to the historically 
low-cost federal hydropower that the region may have come to take for 
granted.  But BPA—the federal marketing agent for the Federal Columbia 
River Power System (FCRPS)—was assured that it could recover its 
costs of operation through regular cost-of-service rate cases.24 
BPA’s extensive reliance on low-cost hydropower has nevertheless 
meant a great deal of uncertainty and variability in BPA’s generation 
output—even before the addition of significant new wind generation.  
According to BPA, “BPA’s weather-dependent hydro resources create 
high supply uncertainty for power planning and marketing activities.”25  
This high supply uncertainty is “due to the unpredictability of water 
supply volumes and runoff timing within a given year and from year to 
year.”26  The FCRPS has relatively limited storage, making hydropower 
an intermittent, variable, and uncertain resource that creates integration 
costs.  Moreover, hydropower is a resource that generates significant 
environmental costs and is thus subject to stricter environmental regulatory 
constraints than other resources.  The FCRPS faces severe operating 
limits under the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA) and Clean Water 
Act (CWA) to reduce Total Dissolved Gas (TDG) downstream of its 
dams to protect salmon species.27  Higher TDG levels are associated 
with higher salmon mortality and TDG levels are higher if BPA “spills” 
too much water over its dams rather than through its turbines.28 Therefore, 
 24. BPA conducts its own rate case, like a municipal or other publicly-owned 
utility, but it must also get approval of its final rate decisions from FERC.  Bonneville 
Power Admin., Rate Cases, BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., http://www.bpa.gov/Finance/ 
RateCases/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Dec. 19, 2012). 
 25. BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., BPA STRATEGIC DIRECTION 5 (Mar. 2012) 
[hereinafter BPA STRATEGIC DIRECTION]. 
 26. Id. at 20. 
 27. Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs) have been established for TDG levels 
under the federal Clean Water Act (CWA), and the impact of any violation of those TDG 
levels may jeopardize the viability and recovery of various salmon species listed as 
threatened or endangered under the Endangered Species Act (ESA).  Salmon recovery 
and hydropower development and operation have a complex legal relationship in the 
Pacific Northwest that is beyond the scope of this Article.  Both the ESA and CWA are 
constraints on the FCRPS. 
 28. See PAUL J. PICKETT, HELEN RUEDA & MIKE HEROLD, TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY 
LOAD FOR TOTAL DISSOLVED GAS IN THE MID-COLUMBIA RIVER AND LAKE ROOSEVELT 
SUBMITTAL REPORT (June 2004), available at https://fortress.wa.gov/ecy/publications/ 
summarypages/0403002.html for background information on the TDG issue.  See K. E. 
MCGRATH, E. M. DAWLEY & D. R. GEIS, TOTAL DISSOLVED GAS EFFECTS N FISHES OF 
THE LOWER COLUMBIA RIVER (June 2006), available at http://www.pnl.gov/main/ 
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BPA must sometimes generate power even when that hydropower is not 
needed because other system resources are otherwise able to meet the 
demand. 
Of course, it might be the other way around—those other system 
resources are not needed at times when BPA must generate power to 
avoid spilling water that could increase TDG levels.  What is striking 
about the traditional system of cost recovery is that it would not matter 
which is the correct way to characterize the situation: under the traditional 
system, whichever approach would reduce total system costs would be 
the basis for dispatching the individual generating resources in the system.  
Additionally, if investing in new generation or transmission could reduce 
total system costs even further, BPA would be assured of recovering 
those costs and would have incentives to make such investments.  The 
distribution of costs did not affect dispatch, investment, or cost recovery.  
Instead, all of the costs were internalized to allow minimization of total 
system costs. 
Under such a scenario, there would be no conflict over a dispatch 
decision by BPA to curtail one generator rather than another.  And BPA 
would consider all of the opportunity costs associated with its curtailment 
decision if it owned all of the resources that might be subject to 
curtailment.29  But that is not the regulatory or incentive structure we 
have today.  And that is the primary source of the conflict over integration 
costs: who should pay them.  We show in Part III that this is the heart of 
the BPA-wind dispute. 
C. Hybrid Regulatory Structure Shifts Cost Burdens Without                  
Clear Policy Choice 
The new world that BPA and wind generators operate in today is one 
with a hybrid regulatory structure: some entities continue to operate under a 
cost-of-service ratemaking or rate-of-return regulatory system while 
others operate under a “market rate” system where their investments are 
neither subject to regulatory scrutiny for prudency nor guaranteed a 
positive return on investment or even recovery of investment capital.  
The market for these entities enforces prudency, and their rate of return 
is determined by the net income after costs have been deducted from 
revenues.  Reducing costs, therefore, translates directly into an enhanced 
bottom line and return on investment.  For entities like BPA, however, 
publications/external/technical_reports/PNNL-15525.pdf for a technical analysis of how 
TDG levels affect salmon on the lower Columbia River. 
 29. These opportunity costs include all of the net costs after all of the revenues and 
taxes have been accounted for. 
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the costs of integration must be allocated across their customers if the 
costs are not borne by the entities selling power to BPA or seeking to 
utilize BPA’s transmission services to sell the power to California or 
other customers. 
This arrangement is not unique to BPA.  Most utilities continue to 
recover the costs of their transmission system through a hybrid regulatory 
structure that includes some component of either cost-of-service ratemaking 
or rate-of-return regulation coupled with market transactions for 
transmission services.  Moreover, many other generators also continue 
to recover their costs through traditional cost-of-service ratemaking or 
rate-of-return regulation.  Renewables generate revenue through various 
revenue streams.  In contrast, most renewable generators are not assured 
cost recovery and must recover their investments through a combination 
of three revenue streams: (1) from electricity sales through either Power 
Purchase Agreements (PPAs) or spot market transactions; (2) from the 
sale of Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs) that can be used by the 
purchasing utility to meet a state RPS; and (3) from Production Tax Credit 
(PTC) income through the generation and sale of qualifying power.30  
Renewable generators are not only in the business of generating energy; 
they also sell RECs and PTCs to tax equity investors to generate revenue. 
RPS design is an important factor structuring the market for renewables 
generation.  In general, an RPS typically specifies both the characteristics of 
generating resources whose output qualifies as meeting the RPS31 and a 
minimum fraction of annual consumption that the purchasing utility 
(called a load-serving entity [LSE] under California’s RPS) must certify 
it has purchased.  As noted above, California’s RPS target is now 33% 
of total annual consumption (in kWh) by 2017-2020 for each LSE.  The 
California RPS also has intermediate targets of 20% in 2011-2013 and 
 30. For a history of the PTC, see Timothy P. Duane, Greening the Grid: 
Implementing Climate Change Policy Through Energy Efficiency, Renewable Portfolio 
Standards, and Strategic Transmission System Investments, 34 VT. L. REV. 711, 762 
n.201 (2010).  The PTC expired on December 31, 2012 but was extended the next day by 
Congress on January 1, 2013 in the “fiscal cliff” legislation for any projects that start 
construction by the end of 2013.  See Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, Congress Extends Wind 
Energy Tax Credits For Projects That Start in 2013, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N (Jan. 1, 
2013), http://www.awea.org/newsroom/pressreleases/congressextendswindptc.cfm. 
 31. Typical examples of qualifying technologies include wind, solar, biomass, 
geothermal, tidal, wave, hydropower smaller than a particular size or built since a 
particular year.  Some RPSs do not allow municipal solid waste [MSW] to qualify, however, 
unless it is for landfill gas recovery, including full methane capture. 
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25% in 2014-2016.32  Only about 14% of California’s overall consumption 
met the RPS standard in 2011, but the six largest utilities in the state had 
consumption ranging from 16% to 22% that was generated by renewables.33  
Each utility is unique, so both the temporal and spatial variability of load 
and the rest of each utility’s generation resource mix are quite different.34  
Therefore, both the value of each kWh produced by these renewables 
and the impact of each generating plant’s output on total system costs 
vary as a function of each specific utility’s load and resource mix—together 
with the transmission system through which the power must be transmitted 
from the generator to the load.  It is therefore impossible to make a generic 
statement about either the cost or the value of renewable generation under 
the RPS. 
Yet the RPS itself treats every kWh generated by a qualifying renewable 
generator as equal in value: the RPS only counts kWh, so other generating 
characteristics (e.g., timing of output by season or diurnally, geographic 
location, reliability and match with load curve) are not explicitly valued.  
It is comparable to developing an Organic Food Standard (OFS) that 
values only calories: if 33% of one’s annual calories need to come from 
organic sources, however, it is highly likely that the least-cost organic 
calories would be purchased to meet the OFS.  Those calories are likely 
to come primarily from carbohydrates, which could lead to a less 
balanced diet than that which existed before adoption of the OFS.  The 
result could then be a less healthy diet and higher costs to supplement 
dietary deficiencies.  A crude RPS is like this, and it can create incentives 
without regard for either the portfolio value of the renewable generation 
or the costs of integrating those renewables into the system.  In other 
words, total system costs may be higher than with an alternative set of 
renewable generators—even if those alternative generators cost more per 
kWh of output. 
The regulatory entities implementing the California RPS have begun 
to recognize this problem.  There are ongoing efforts to improve the 
resource procurement process so as to recognize a multitude of benefits 
provided by renewables.35  This will be especially important as the rapid 
 32. S.B. 2, supra note 9. 
 33. San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E): 16%; Southern California Edison (SCE): 
19%; Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP): 19%; Pacific Gas & 
Electric (PG&E): 19%; Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD): 22% (these figures 
are based on the individual “Power Content Label” produced by each utility; 2012 data 
was unavailable at press time; the state total includes smaller utilities and is only 14%). 
 34. LADWP generated 41% of its power from coal, for example, while SMUD 
produced 29% of its power from large hydropower; nuclear shares ranged from 0-24% 
while large hydropower shares ranged from 0-29%. 
 35. S.B. 2(1x) gives the CPUC the discretion to incorporate these factors, and 
CPUC procedures are attempting to address these factors through a “least-cost, best-fit” 
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RPS ramp-up occurs up until 2020.  There is a clear need to create 
incentives for providing integration services and to diversify the portfolio of 
generating resources—both in terms of technology and geography—in 
order to develop a robust, reliable, least-cost system with high levels of 
renewables. 
There is potential to develop such a diversified portfolio of renewables.  
Illustrative output by renewables into the CAISO on a single day shows 
how different types of renewables generate power at different times that 
can complement both each other and demand. Geothermal, biomass, 
biogas, and small hydro generation are relatively steady (with some ramping 
capability by hydro in response to peak demand and higher prices) on a 
daily basis—though the small hydro faces greater inter-annual and seasonal 
variation—while solar rises with the sun on a predictable basis and goes 
down as the sun goes down. Wind is the most unpredictable, but our ability 
to predict it increases considerably (while the variability associated with 
its total output decreases) as both the number of wind turbines and the 
geographic scale of their generation increase.  Simulations of output in the 
Pacific Northwest show that wave or tidal power can also be incorporated 
into the generation resource mix to provide power output that does not 
co-vary with the rest of the portfolio, decreasing uncertainty and variability 
of generation from the overall portfolio.36  Wave or tidal power is also 
more predictable than wind. 
But we do not generally pay renewable generators for these system or 
portfolio benefits; instead, they must compete with each other to be the 
least-cost bidder to win a PPA under the RPS.37  Carbohydrates usually 
win if you are unwilling to pay a premium for the benefits of protein; 
that is also the case in competitive bidding for RECs and for PPAs under 
the RPS.  The result is a lot of wind—because it is generally a more mature 
technology and, therefore, a lower cost than most other renewables—in 
procurement system.  See Order Instituting Rulemaking to Integrate and Refine Procurement 
Policies and Consider Long-Term Procurement Plans, R1005006 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n 
May 6, 2010).  The actual RPS is measured only in kWh, though, without regard to whether 
the kWh are “carbohydrates” or “protein.” 
 36. Douglas A. Halamay et al., Reserve Requirement Impacts of Large-Scale 
Integration of Wind, Solar, and Ocean Wave Power Generation, 2 IEEE TRANSACTIONS 
ON SUSTAINABLE ENERGY 321, 321–22 (2011). 
 37. There is a tension between “least cost” and “best fit” in procurement policies, 
and a focus on minimizing the cost of renewables procurement has generally been at the 
expense of getting the “best fit” in the generating portfolio; also, note that markets do not 
now generally compensate for these non-commodity system benefits. 
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the places with the highest wind potential—because that is how individual 
project developers can generate power and RECs at the lowest cost.  
“Current wind projects,” notes the BPA, “are heavily concentrated in the 
Columbia River Plateau . . . in part because there are insufficient incentives 
in place to diversify the geographic siting of wind projects.”38  The 
Columbia Gorge offers a tremendous wind resource in the Pacific 
Northwest, which means that wind generation patterns in the region are 
highly correlated.  That high correlation translates into high coincident 
demand for BPA’s transmission services to export the region’s wind to 
California to garner the highest total revenue due to higher prices for the 
power itself or the RECs to meet California’s RPS.  Unfortunately, much 
of the Columbia Gorge wind blows during high spring runoff periods.  
The result is a direct conflict for transmission capacity between hydropower, 
primarily intended for sale to BPA’s preference customers, who are 
primarily public utilities, and wind, intended for sale to California 
utilities—although REC sales to California LSE’s to meet the California 
RPS and tax income from the PTC are also critical sources of revenue 
for wind developers and operators. 
Legal conflicts over integration reflect a failure to make clear policy 
choices about cost allocation under our hybrid regulatory structure.  The 
BPA-wind dispute illustrates the limits of the existing legal regime to 
resolve the cost allocation conflict in a way that will assure both cost 
recovery and predictability for utilities and generators without that policy 
choice. 
III.  WIND, WATER, AND THE BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION 
In this Part, we describe and analyze the BPA-wind legal dispute 
before FERC and demonstrate that the hybrid regulatory structure under 
which that dispute is being resolved has not yet addressed the critical 
policy choice regarding how to allocate integration costs.  The BPA-
wind dispute is the most prominent example to date of a legal conflict 
over integration costs, but similar disputes are likely to arise on an ad 
hoc basis until FERC establishes clear policies to reduce integration costs 
and to allocate those costs among generators, transmission providers, and 
ratepayers.  Part IV summarizes strategies to reduce integration costs and 
Part V recommends cost allocation principles. 
In June 2011, a group of wind-facility owners filed a petition against 
the BPA, alleging that the BPA’s redispatch policy, based on Dispatch 
 38. BPA STRATEGIC DIRECTION, supra note 25, at 20. 
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Standing Order 216 (DSO 216),39 was unduly discriminatory against 
wind generators in favor of federal hydropower generators and their 
customers.40  FERC, having determined that transmission policy—not 
generation policy—was at the heart of this dispute, held that DSO 216 
violated section 211A of the Federal Power Act (FPA)41 because it resulted 
in noncomparable transmission service.42  DSO 216 unfairly treated 
nonfederal wind generators by interrupting their customers’ point-to-
point transmission service during high-volume runoff events without 
causing similar interruptions to firm transmission service held by federal 
hydropower generators.43 
While FERC directed the BPA to revise its policy to resolve the 
comparability issues with its transmission service, the Commission declined 
to “specify the precise terms and conditions” that this revised policy 
should contain to comply with section 211A.44  As a result, the BPA 
 39. Bonneville Power Admin., DSO 216 Overview & Requirements, BPA-
TRANSMISSION SERVICES, http://transmission.bpa.gov/wind/op_controls/dso216_overview_ 
requirements.pdf (last updated Nov. 29, 2011) [hereinafter DSO 216 Overview].  Please 
note that the BPA provides DSOs only to dispatchers and wind operators.  See 
Bonneville Power Admin., Requesting DSO 216, BPA-TRANSMISSION SERVICES (Nov. 2, 
2009), http://transmission.bpa.gov/wind/op_controls/requesting_dso_ 216.pdf. 
 40. Iberdrola Renewables, Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 137 F.E.R.C.         
¶ 61,185, at para. 1 (Dec. 7, 2011) (Order Granting Petition). 
 41. Id. at paras. 32–35.  Specifically, section 211A reads: 
[T]he Commission may, by rule or order, require an unregulated transmitting 
utility to provide transmission services (1) at rates that are comparable to those 
that the unregulated transmitting utility charges itself; and (2) on terms and 
conditions (not relating to rates) that are comparable to those under which the 
unregulated transmitting utility provides transmission services to itself and that 
are not unduly discriminatory or preferential. 
16 U.S.C. § 824j-1(b) (2005). 
 42. Iberdrola, 137 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,185, at paras. 63–64. 
 43. Id. at para. 62. 
 44. Id. at para. 65.  Specifically, FERC stated: 
While we will not specify the precise terms and conditions that must be set 
forth in Bonneville’s OATT in order to remedy the non-comparable services . . . , 
pursuant to section 211A Bonneville must address the comparability concerns . . . 
As we noted above, the Commission appreciates that Bonneville must reconcile the 
obligations set forth in its organic statutes with numerous rules and regulations, 
including those under the Endangered Species Act and the Clean Water Act.  
As directed in this order, Bonneville also must reconcile the provision of 
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submitted to FERC its Oversupply Management Protocol (OMP),45 along 
with a revised Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT), in March 
2012.  The BPA’s revised policy only renewed the debate.46 
In this Part, we provide an analysis of the parties’ legal issues and 
arguments, tracing this dispute from its origin with the BPA’s issuance 
of DSO 216 to the OMP in March 2012.  While the wind industry’s 
dispute with the BPA is legally unique, as will be discussed herein, we 
nonetheless seek to identify critical issues that impact a redispatch policy 
generally—which can then serve as a lens through which we might analyze 
redispatch and transmission concerns more generally to develop policies 
that reduce both the cost of, and conflict over, renewables integration.  
We demonstrate that existing law is inadequate to resolve the legal dispute 
unless the policy choice on cost allocation is made explicitly. 
A.  FERC’s Transmission Policy 
Before embarking on our description and analysis of the legal dispute 
between Pacific Northwest wind generators and the BPA, it is important 
to highlight key FERC Orders that impact the transmission policies of 
providers like the BPA, the CAISO, and Regional Transmission 
Organizations (RTOs).47  In April 1996, FERC issued Order No. 888, 
establishing, among other things, the “open access” rule that requires 
transmission owners to offer nondiscriminatory, comparable transmission 
service to all service customers.48  Approximately one year later, the 
Commission issued Order No. 888-A, which set forth guidelines on 
implementing this open access rule—including the use of the Open Access 
Same-Time Information System, or OASIS.49  Order No. 888-A is often 
 45. See BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., OVERSUPPLY MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL, VERSION 
2 (2012) (Superceded by Version 3, effective Apr. 2, 2013), available at http:// transmission. 
bpa.gov/ts_business_practices/Content/Archive/Oversupply_mgt_protocol_archive.htm 
[hereinafter OMP].  This discussion refers to Version 2 (2012); Version 3 was released 
as this Article was going to press and was therefore unavailable for analysis.  All of the 
proceedings before FERC discussed here were regarding Version 2. 
 46. See Protest of Complainants, Iberdola Renewables, Inc. v. Bonneville Power 
Admin., (F.E.R.C. 2013) (Docket No. EL11-44-002); Response of the Bonneville Power 
Administration, Iberdola Renewables Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., (F.E.R.C. 2013) 
(Docket No. EL11-44-002) [hereinafter BPA’s Response to comments]. 
 47. The BPA is neither an ISO nor an RTO and has resisted establishment of either 
in the Pacific Northwest. 
 48. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory 
Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 1996) (codified 
at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385). 
 49. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory 
Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,274 (Mar. 14, 1997) (codified 
at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
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referred to as the pro forma OATT.50  In 2007, FERC reformed its 
transmission policy to strengthen this pro forma OATT so that the 
Commission could more effectively address undue discrimination and 
facilitate its enforcement and regulation of transmission grid operations.51 
FERC has continued to amend its open access transmission policy 
over time,52 most recently in ways that directly connect to the BPA 
dispute.  For example, in October 2010, FERC issued a clarification order53 
confirming that California “has a wide degree of latitude in setting 
avoided cost” and “can utilize a multi-tiered avoided cost rate structure” 
that would be consistent with the avoided-cost requirements under section 
210 of Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act54—including any inclusion 
of the state’s procurement obligations in its calculation of avoided cost.55  
In 2010, the tension between high-volume runoff and the variability of 
wind generation had reached its peak, and the BPA launched a project to 
reconcile competing costs.56  That project gave way to DSO 216, which 
the BPA utilized in its redispatch policy during high-volume runoff.57 
However, in July 2011, FERC issued Order No. 1000.58  Order No. 1000 
amended the open access transmission policy by requiring transmission 
providers to develop region-wide policies that consider how both federal 
 50. See, e.g., Iberdrola, 137 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,185 at para. 3. 
 51. Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, 72 
Fed. Reg. 12,266 (Mar. 15, 2007) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 37). 
 52. FERC’s amendments to the open access transmission policy include Orders 
888, 889, and 890.  FERC introduced a “pro forma OATT” under Order 888, which is 
one element in the wind industry’s position in this dispute.  Promoting Wholesale 
Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory Transmission Services by Public 
Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 62 
Fed. Reg. 12274-01 (Mar. 14, 1997) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35); see also Iberdrola, 
137 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,185 at paras. 3, 21. 
 53. FERC Order Granting Clarification and Dismissing Rehearing, 133 F.E.R.C.   
¶ 61,059 (2010). 
 54. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2005). 
 55. CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, LEGAL SUMMARY OF THE THREE FEDERAL ENERGY 
REGULATORY COMMISSION (FERC) ORDERS RELATED TO THE COMBINED HEAT AND POWER 
FEED-IN TARIFF PROGRAM,  http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/37527239-30C5-403D- 
91FF-3CCBE2AFCAB8/0/LegalSummaryofFERCCHPFiT.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2012). 
 56. See DSO 216 Overview, supra note 39, at 1. 
 57. See id. 
 58. For a quick guide to the key requirements under FERC Order 1000, see FED. 
ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N FACTS (July 21, 
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and state public policy affects transmission needs.59  Energy experts 
believed Order No. 1000 would enable the national grid to evolve to 
meet the increasing transmission demand from renewable energy.60  
Furthermore, some scholars suggest that Order No. 1000 could mark a 
shift toward comprehensive transmission strategies that involve thoughtful 
consideration of how transmission demand is affected by energy efficiency, 
demand response, and demand reduction.61  A month after FERC issued 
Order No. 1000, a group of wind generators in the Pacific Northwest filed 
a petition with FERC against the BPA’s redispatch policy.62 
Most recently, in June 2012, FERC approved Order No. 764, effective 
June 2013, to improve VER integration.63  While this rule will impact the 
several aspects of transmission service for variable-energy generators, 
Order No. 764 (discussed in Part V below) does not directly address 
either the BPA’s curtailment authority or cost allocation of renewables 
integration. The prospect of continued conflicts before FERC between 
BPA and wind generators is therefore high despite Order No. 764. 
B.  Factual Background: Hydropower, High-Volume Runoff, and Wind 
The BPA is not a public utility; it is a nonprofit organization described 
as a “federal power marketing agency,”64 that markets power in the 
Pacific Northwest from federal sources, namely hydropower, as well as 
nonfederal sources, primarily wind at this time.65  The BPA’s task as a 
transmission service provider is to ensure that the Pacific Northwest has 
a system that adequately integrates and transmits affordable power from 
both federal and nonfederal generation sources while maintaining 
electrical reliability and stability.66  In addition to this goal, however, the 
BPA must mitigate the FCRPS impact on fish and wildlife in the Pacific 
 59. Shelley Welton & Michael B. Gerrard, Comment, FERC Order 1000 as a New 
Tool for Promoting Energy Efficiency and Demand Response, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS 
& ANALYSIS 11025 (2012). 
 60. See id. 
 61. Id. (discussing how Order 1000 could serve as opportunity for transmission 
planning that better matches current and evolving demands on national grid). 
 62. Iberdrola, 137 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,185 at para. 1. 
 63. See DSO 216 Overview, supra note 39. 
 64. Iberdrola, 137 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,185 at para. 2. 
 65. Bonneville Power Admin., 2011 BPA Facts, BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., 
http://www.bpa.gov/corporate/about_BPA/Facts/FactDocs/BPA_Facts_2011.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2012).  The BPA markets wholesale power from 31 federal hydroelectric 
sources, as well as a few nonfederal electric sources—specifically, wind.  Id.  The BPA’s 
service area includes Idaho, Oregon, Washington, parts of Montana, California, Nevada, 
Utah, and Wyoming.  Id. 
 66. Bonneville Power Admin., Mission Vision Values, BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., 
http://www.bpa.gov/corporate/About_BPA/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2012). 
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Northwest.67  While many statutes impose obligations on the BPA, including 
environmental concerns that are relevant to public utilities as well, the 
intersection of these two basic goals—reliable, integrated service and 
mitigation of impact on salmon—are at the heart of the current dispute.68 
A few years ago, the BPA sought to address the effect of variable-
energy resources, namely, wind, on its ability to meet its goal of reliable, 
integrated transmission service—especially given the ever-increasing 
wind capacity in its service territory.69  Therefore, the BPA issued DSO 
216,70 the mechanics of which are as follows.  When a wind plant is 
actually generating more than allotted under its transmission schedule, 
the BPA must offset such over-generation by decreasing federal 
generation.71  In such circumstances, DSO 216 enabled the BPA to place 
“generation output limits” on the over-generating wind plant, relative to 
its schedule, and require the plant to lower its generation accordingly or 
face penalties.72  But when a wind plant is actually generating less than 
its transmission schedule, the BPA must increase federal generation to 
make up the difference.73  In such circumstances, DSO 216 enabled the 
BPA to automatically curtail the transmission schedule for the under-
generating wind plant, relative to its actual generation, for the remainder 
of the operating hour.74 
 67. Id. 
 68. While the wind industry has repeatedly questioned whether the BPA is truly 
concerned about its environmental obligations, as opposed to a desire to shift costs of 
operation to nonfederal generation in favor of federal hydropower customers, the BPA 
cites multiple statutes as sources of its obligations.  Iberdrola, 137 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,185 at 
paras. 22, 24.  These include the Northwest Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839, the Federal 
Columbia River Transmission System Act, 16 U.S.C. § 838, the Pacific Northwest 
Power Preference Act, 16 U.S.C. § 837, the Bonneville Project Act, 16 U.S.C. § 832, the 
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1341, and the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536.  
Id.  According to BPA, “[s]everal commenters noted that Oregon and Washington have 
different TDG standards” and “suggested BPA should seek to change Washington’s 
standard to conform with Oregon’s. This would allow river operators to spill more 
water.”  BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., BPA AND FISH PASSAGE CENTER STUDY EFFECTS 
OF CHANGING TOTAL DISSOLVED GAS STANDARDS 1 (2011).  However, “BPA concluded 
from these studies that a change in the dissolved gas standard would produce a modest 
reduction in overgeneration spill.”  Id. at 2. 
 69. See DSO 216 Overview, supra note 39. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. § II(B)(1). 
 72. Id. § II(C)(1). 
 73. Id. § II(B)(2). 
 74. Id. § II(C)(2). 
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In 2010 and 2011, however, the tension between the BPA’s goals of 
reliable, integrated transmission and mitigation of environmental impact 
reached an all-time high, ultimately due to high-volume runoff from 
melting snowpack but exacerbated by variable wind generation.75  While 
in the past the BPA has addressed high-volume runoff by providing low-
cost federal hydropower to its customers, spring 2011 proved to be the 
fourth highest runoff since 1929.76  Having determined that providing 
low-cost or negative-cost hydropower to its customers during high-water 
runoff was not a sustainable strategy, the BPA announced that it would 
curtail nonfederal generation as needed, pursuant to protocol under DSO 
216.77  In doing so, the BPA’s curtailment would be automatic, unilateral, 
and—most importantly—uncompensated.78 
C.  Round 1: Dispute over DSO 216 
During the spring of 2011, the BPA unilaterally curtailed 97,577 
megawatt hours (MWh) of wind generation to deal with high-water 
runoff.79  On June 13, 2011, a group of wind-facility owners responded, 
 75. Bruce W. Radford, Bonneville’s Balancing Act, 149 PUB. UTIL. FORT., no. 9, 
2011 at 24, 25.  As Radford effectively describes the phenomenon, increased spillway 
discharge creates dangerous levels of dissolved gas and bubble trauma that can fatally 
injure native fish.  Id. at 24.  Already having to reduce its generation due to increased 
spillway discharges, federal hydropower was further reduced due to its displacement by 
wind generation.  Id.  The lack of variable fuel costs, as well as the demand for tax 
credits and renewable energy certificates, makes the wind industry unlikely to voluntarily 
curtail generation.  Id. 
 76. Id. at 25–26. 
 77. Id. at 26; see also DSO 216 Overview, supra note 39. 
 78. Radford provides a sufficient analysis of the BPA’s announcement: 
Under this new regime, developed through a stakeholder process that began 
after the spring 2010 runoff pushed resources to the limit, BPA announced 
that, if necessary to avoid harmful spill and satisfy its statutory obligations—to 
preserve fish and wildlife, to market low-cost hydropower to state and 
municipal preference customers, and to operate and recover costs in a businesslike 
fashion—it wouldn’t agree to accept a negative price in order to over-generate 
and divert water through dam turbines.  That is, it wouldn’t agree to pay 
customers, as the market otherwise would dictate, for the privilege of running 
its turbines to avoid harmful spill when to do so would produce output in 
excess of the actual hydropower load requirement.  Rather, it would simply 
curtail non-federal generation as needed—thermal plants first, followed by 
wind—and replace that power with its own turbine-generated FCRPS output, 
and send it to the would-be thermal and wind off-takers, using the same 
transmission capacity and schedule rights owned by the curtailed thermal and 
wind plants.  And BPA under this policy wouldn’t consent to pay a negative 
price, nor would it compensate curtailed wind generators for lost PTCs and 
RECs. 
Radford, supra note 75, at 26. 
 79. Iberdrola, 137 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,185, at para. 63, n.99; see also Radford, supra 
note 75, at 27.  For statistics of the BPA’s limit and curtailment events in 2011 and 2012, 
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filing a petition with FERC that alleged the BPA “[used] its transmission 
market power to curtail wind generators in an unduly discriminatory 
manner in order to protect its preferred power customer base from costs 
it does not consider socially optimal.”80  On December 7, 2011, the 
Commission declined to rule on the BPA’s 2011 wind curtailment actions, 
but it ordered the BPA to revise its transmission policy such that, moving 
forward, transmission service is not unduly discriminatory or preferential in 
violation of section 211A of the FPA.81  This section will outline the legal 
issues and arguments, including FERC’s jurisdictional authority, 
noncomparability analysis under the FPA, and its short analyses of the 
parties’ interconnection agreements and e-tag issues. 
1.  FERC Jurisdiction: Shifting Focus From Past                                
Conduct to Prospective Policy 
Before FERC could analyze the merits of the dispute, it had to address 
the BPA’s initial position that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, not 
FERC, had jurisdiction over the matter.82  Specifically, the BPA argued 
that the Ninth Circuit had exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to the 
redispatch policy, which constituted a “final action” under the Northwest 
Power Act.83  While the term “final action” is not defined under that 
statute, the BPA provided two arguments that its policy constituted such.  
First, the redispatch policy is the result of the BPA’s completed 
decision-making process and directly affects the generators party to this 
dispute.84  Alternatively, the policy represents final action under the 
see BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., BAPT OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS DSO216 REPORT (2012), 
available at http://transmission.bpa.gov/wind/op_controls/FY_2012_Q1_Q2_Q3_Q4_DS 
O216_Event_Report.pdf. 
 80. Iberdrola, 137 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,185, at para. 1. 
 81. Id. at paras. 63, 65. 
 82. Id. at paras. 19, 22.  Specifically, the BPA had filed a motion with FERC to 
hold the matter in abeyance pending the Ninth Circuit’s review of a motion that had been 
filed by joint intervenors.  Id. at para. 18.  While it appears that wind proponents had filed the 
motion with the Ninth Circuit as a secondary strategy to the FERC petition, the BPA 
likely believed that a Ninth Circuit ruling based on the Northwest Power Act would have 
been more favorable than a FERC ruling under the FPA. 
 83. Id. at para. 22; 16 U.S.C. § 839f(e)(5) (2012). 
 84. Iberdrola, 137 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,185, at para. 23 (citing Bennett v. Spears, 520 U.S. 
154 (1997) (setting standard for defining “final action” for purposes of establishing 
jurisdictional authority over an agency)). 
 27 
 
DUANE-GRIFFITH (DO NOT DELETE) 2/29/2016  10:26 AM 
 
Ninth Circuit’s “true nature” test because the BPA’s conduct reflects its 
statutory authority and concomitant statutory obligations.85 
On the other hand, the wind generators argued that FERC’s authority 
under section 211A of the FPA is not subordinate to or limited by the 
BPA’s enabling statutes and that section 211A could be applied without 
conflict.86  With respect to “final action,” the wind generators argued 
that the BPA’s policy was not mandated by the Northwest Power Act, 
and that the statute was not the source of their grievance—which was 
firmly rooted in the FPA’s discriminatory restrictions.87 
FERC ultimately exerted its jurisdictional authority over the dispute 
under section 211A of the FPA, but, in doing so, the Commission 
surrendered an ability to determine whether the BPA’s past curtailment 
of wind was legally prohibited.88  Section 211A authorizes FERC to 
require the BPA, by rule or order, to provide transmission services that 
are comparable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential to services 
that it charges and provides to itself.89  By interpreting this provision as 
authorizing the Commission to take prospective action, requiring the 
BPA to file a revised tariff governing future services, FERC expressly 
declined to retroactively determine whether past wind curtailment was 
prohibited under the BPA’s enabling statutes—avoiding the question of 
“final action” that may trigger Ninth Circuit jurisdiction.90  In other words, 
the fundamental jurisdictional issue may be responsible, at least in part, 
for the lack of guidance in the Commission’s ruling on whether the BPA 
could continue to unilaterally curtail nonfederal generation during high-
volume runoff events.91  The Commission must first address the policy 
 85. Id. at para. 24 (citing M-S-R Pub. Power Agency v. Bonneville Power Admin., 
297 F.3d 833, 840 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also BPA STRATEGIC DIRECTION supra note 28, 
at 21 (listing multiple statutory obligations under which BPA operates). 
 86. Iberdrola, 137 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,185, at para. 20.  “According to Petitioners, a 
directive under section 211A would simply add another comparability standard for terms 
and conditions of Bonneville’s transmission service . . .  Petitioners also assert that the 
Commission can act under section 211A without interfering with Bonneville’s 
environmental obligations.”  Id. 
 87. Id. at para. 29. 
 88. Id. at para. 30.  The Commission’s rationale as to why section 211A applies to 
this dispute, and its analysis under section 211A, will be discussed in the following 
section. 
 89. 16 U.S.C. § 824j-1(b). 
 90. Iberdrola, 137 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,185, at para. 30.  “To the extent Bonneville’s past 
actions are subject to judicial review by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, such review 
does not limit the Commission’s prospective exercise of authority in this proceeding 
under section 211A of the FPA.”  Id. 
 91. There could also be policy concerns driving FERC’s decision not to analyze 
the appropriateness of the BPA’s past curtailment, including the impact of setting a 
national curtailment standard under section 211A, as opposed to letting a unique transmission 
provider find its own resolution to the issue.  But this Article explores FERC’s 
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question of how to allocate integration costs before it can rule on the 
validity of BPA’s curtailment actions; otherwise, a ruling on those actions 
is a de facto policy choice on allocation. 
2.  Section 211A: At the Heart of Generation Curtailment is a                
Right to Transmission 
FERC firmly stated that its jurisdictional authority to grant relief in the 
present dispute stemmed from section 211A of the FPA.92  In determining 
that the dispute fit squarely under its section 211A authority, the Commission 
described the dispute as one of transmission—not generation.93  Specifically, 
the Commission stated: 
As Congress has recognized, open access is a fundamental tenet of electricity 
markets.  Clear and firm principles on open access give industry the confidence to 
invest in new generation resources and support the construction of associated 
transmission necessary to meet future needs . . . [W]e recognize the dilemma 
that Bonneville faces in having to navigate among many competing obligations, 
. . . [but the redispatch policy] results in Bonneville providing transmission 
service to others on terms and conditions that are not comparable to those it 
provides itself.  For these reasons, we find it appropriate to act under FPA 
section 211A.94 
Thus, FERC agreed with the wind generators that this dispute, while 
involving the curtailment of generation, fundamentally presented an 
issue of transmission rights.95  Wind-facility owners had argued that a 
curtailment policy enabling the BPA to substitute its federal hydropower 
for wind—and other nonfederal generation—whenever it unilaterally 
deems it necessary is noncomparable because it prefers federal generation 
over nonfederal.96  But the BPA submitted at least five distinct arguments in 
defense of its redispatch policy.  Below is a summary of BPA’s main 
arguments, presented in response to key wind industry arguments.97 
determinations on two other issues, which appear to presume the BPA’s ability to 
unilaterally curtail—so long as such curtailment is comparable. 
 92. Iberdrola, 137 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,185, at para. 30.  Since FERC would apply and 
grant relief under section 211A in this matter, the Commission declined to address the 
wind generators’ alternative claims, under sections 210 and 212 of the FPA, that it 
compel the BPA to adhere to the terms of its interconnection agreements.  Id. at paras. 9, 31. 
 93. Id. at paras. 32, 62–64. 
 94. Id. at paras. 32–33. 
 95. Id. at paras. 62–64. 
 96. Id. at para. 61. 
 97. Please note that, given the focus on the BPA’s distinct arguments in defense of 
its redispatch policy, this summary reorders the FERC’s listing of party arguments. 
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First, wind generators had asserted that the BPA’s redispatch policy 
squarely affected their transmission rights because the redispatch policy 
curtailed competing nonfederal generators and used their service to 
delivery federal hydropower to the load.98  “[The BPA] does not 
compensate curtailed wind generators for its appropriation of their right 
to serve their customers or for the use of the firm transmission rights 
reserved for curtailed wind generators’ output.”99  In response, the BPA 
argued that its policy does not affect transmission rights because it does 
not deprive wind generators of transmission access in violation of their 
interconnection agreements; rather, it only limits the ability of a wind 
facility that is interconnected to the FCRPS to generate.100  The BPA and 
its proponents argued that no section 211A claim should be sustained 
because the transmission schedules are honored: nonfederal energy 
customers still receive energy after curtailment—it is just power generated 
by federal hydropower rather than power generated by the contracted 
source of generation.101 
Second, wind generators had alleged that, while the BPA delivers 
federal hydropower to match the curtailed wind facility’s schedule and 
to meet the wind customers’ needs, the energy product becomes ineligible 
for California’s renewable portfolio standard requirements, resulting in 
economic loss.102  While the BPA maintained its initial position that 
section 211A is inapplicable, it alternatively argued that its policy does 
not violate comparability and is, therefore, not unduly discriminatory.103  
Since the BPA does not usurp wind energy for its own use but rather 
substitutes federal hydropower in its daily management of transmission 
service, wind’s resultant loss in revenue or tax credits should not render 
the redispatch policy non-comparable.104  Furthermore, the BPA pointed 
to a prior FERC ruling to argue that such an economic consequence is 
irrelevant to a determination of comparability where the transmission 
terms are otherwise equally applied to federal and nonfederal generators.105 
 98. Id. at para. 36. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at paras. 36, 45 (emphasis added). 
 101. Id. at para. 45.  NRECA was one of the parties advocating this position in 
comments before FERC. 
 102. Id. at para. 49. 
 103. Id. at para. 41. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id.  (citing Bonneville Power Admin. v. Puget Sound Energy, Inc., 125 F.E.R.C.    
¶ 61,273 (2008)).  In this 2008 ruling, FERC confirmed that comparability depends 
on whether a transmission provider treats affiliated and nonaffiliated generators on a 
comparable basis—an inquiry “unaffected by whether the opportunity of the generators, 
either affiliated or unaffiliated, to recover their lost revenue is [sic] through Commission-
jurisdictional rates or non-jurisdictional rates.”  Puget Sound Energy, Inc., 125 FERC at 
62,315–16.  But, in that case, both affiliated and nonaffiliated generators were similarly 
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Third, wind generators had identified alternative solutions for managing 
high-volume runoff, including “entering into storage arrangements with 
entities in British Columbia, entering into agreements with regional 
investor-owned utilities for displacement of thermal and non-thermal 
generation outside Bonneville’s balancing authority area and paying some 
degree of negative prices to induce owners of generators in the area, 
including wind generators, to back down generation.”106  In response, the 
BPA argued that a directive to revise its redispatch policy under section 
211A would compromise its compliance with its myriad statutory 
obligations, which compelled its implementation of a curtailment policy 
in the first place: “[C]urtailments are necessary for Bonneville to manage its 
hydro facilities during high water events, to ensure reliability, and to 
ensure that Bonneville meets its Clean Water Act and Endangered Species 
obligations and other statutory responsibilities under the Northwest Power 
Act.”107 
Fourth, wind generators had argued that FERC consistently characterizes 
the pro forma OATT as the “minimum terms and conditions of non-
discriminatory service,” such that the BPA’s deviations should be dispositive 
of noncomparable service unless FERC permitted the deviation.108  In 
response, the BPA argued that, as an unregulated transmitting utility, it 
is not required to adopt the pro forma OATT—and section 211A does 
not authorize the Commission to require such adoption.109 
affected by the BPA’s policy for deadband reactive power service; the nonaffiliates’ 
noncomparability argument focused on the BPA’s ability to subsidize its costs by raising 
rates of captive customers—something nonaffiliates could not do without risking sales 
revenue.  Id. at 62,314.  FERC held that, because both affiliates and nonaffiliates must 
recover their losses in some way, the policy was comparable.  Id. at 62,315. 
In the current dispute, only nonfederal wind generators claim an economic loss due to 
the BPA’s redispatch policy; federal hydropower is not curtailed at all but instead 
substitutes its energy for wind customers.  FERC characterized this as an interruption in 
transmission service that is not comparably incurred by both federal and nonfederal 
generators.  Iberdrola, 137 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,185, at para. 62.  But perhaps its 2008 ruling 
could also be distinguished on grounds that the BPA’s current redispatch policy involves 
unilateral curtailment and one-sided economic loss. 
 106. Iberdrola, 137 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,185, at para. 39. 
 107. Id. at para. 42.  FERC ultimately bought this argument, but only in the sense 
that the BPA, not FERC, must decide how best to balance these competing obligations—
including comparable service—in its revised policy.  Id. at para. 64. 
 108. Id. at para. 37. 
 109. Id. at para. 43.  FERC seemed to buy this argument as well, by placing the 
onus on the BPA to decide how best to balance its statutory obligations with the section 
211A requirement of comparable service.  Id. at para. 65.  However, the Commission did 
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Fifth, wind generators had argued that the BPA’s refusal to pay low-
cost or negative prices inappropriately shifted the burden of hydropower 
over-generation onto the wind industry by way of a policy that sought 
primarily to “protect its preference power customers from increased costs,” 
rather than to mitigate environmental impact.110  According to the wind 
industry, the BPA’s willingness to offer negative-price hydropower would 
allow wind generators to independently decide when to curtail—which 
would be based in part on each facility’s specific tax credit and revenue 
concerns.111  Furthermore, there is a growing concern that the BPA’s 
policy would “impose a chilling effect on wind industry development” as 
potential generators begin to fear that the BPA can unilaterally curtail 
generation and amend interconnection agreements.112  In response, the 
BPA asserted that payment of low-cost or negative prices for hydropower 
would “jeopardize” its statutory obligations to the U.S. Treasury, 
“jeopardize” its statutory obligation to provide lowest possible rates, and 
“inappropriately transfer the costs of wind development incentives to 
customers who do not benefit from [wind power].”113  It is not coincidental 
in this dispute that most of the wind serves California load and has been 
developed specifically in response to California’s aggressive RPS policies. 
In the end, FERC ruled that the BPA’s redispatch policy resulted in 
noncomparable service, justifying its exercise of section 211A authority, 
because the policy unfairly treated nonfederal generators by interrupting 
their customers’ point-to-point service without comparable interruptions 
identify adoption of the pro forma OATT as one option available to the BPA.  Id. at para. 
65, n.101. 
 110. Id. at para. 8.  Pursuant to this argument, the BPA must address its multiple 
goals of cheap power, integrated transmission, and mitigation of environmental impact 
by “modern-day market precepts—which, under certain conditions of stream-flow dynamics 
and electric supply and demand, might imply a zero or even negative price for its hydro 
output.”  Radford, supra note 75, at 24. 
 111. Iberdrola, 137 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,185, at para. 40.  Of course, a wind generator, 
with no variable fuel costs, arguably has little-to-no incentive to voluntarily ramp down 
or go off-line when faced with the potential loss in tax credits and renewable energy 
certificates.  See Radford, supra note 75, at 25.  But perhaps the wind industry’s point 
here was that, in terms of production-forecasting and interconnection negotiations, federal and 
nonfederal generators could proactively compromise instead of a transmission provider’s 
retroactive, unilateral curtailment. 
 112. Radford, supra note 75, at 28 (noting that owners of Shepherds Flat Wind 
Farm were among those voicing concerns of chilling effect). 
 113. Iberdrola, 137 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,185, at para. 44.  The BPA apparently also 
argued that continued payment of hydropower at negative prices could produce the 
“converse of the California power crisis seen a decade ago.”  Radford, supra note 75, at 
30 (“CAISO was forced to offer sky-high prices to keep the lights on . . . Just as the ISO 
purchased power at any price to avoid blackouts, Bonneville could be forced to pay any 
negative price to avoid spill.”).  See generally Timothy P. Duane, Regulation’s Rationale: 
Learning from the California Energy Crisis, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 471 (2002) (providing a 
detailed discussion of the California electricity crisis and its consequences). 
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to service held by federal hydropower generators.114  The Commission 
was convinced by the wind-facility owners’ evidence of the business, 
commercial, and economic impacts of the BPA’s policy.115  The Commission 
initially cited $50 million in potential lost tax credits and energy 
certificates,116 but later estimated that the total cost to wind generators 
was more likely to be as low as $2.15 million.117  FERC also found harm 
to load-serving entities that were rendered ineligible to satisfy state 
renewable portfolio standard requirements as a result of curtailment.118 
FERC ordered the BPA to file a revised tariff within ninety days of its 
ruling to address the comparability concerns, but the Commission declined 
to specify the “precise terms and conditions” that the BPA’s revised 
OATT must include to remedy the non-comparable service caused by its 
 114. Iberdrola, 137 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,185, at para. 62. 
 115. Id. at para. 63. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at para. 63, n.99.  The BPA apparently first noted the $50 million figure in 
its final record of decision, and this figure was based on peer review studies that assumed 
a combined REC/PTC value of $38/MWh.  BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., BPA’S INTERIM 
ENVIRONMENTAL REDISPATCH AND NEGATIVE PRICING POLICIES, ADMINISTRATOR’S FINAL 
RECORD OF DECISION 29 (May 2011), available at http://www.bpa.gov/news/pubs/Records 
ofDecision/rod-20110513-Interim-Environmental-Redispatch-and-Negative-Pricing-Policies. 
pdf [hereinafter FINAL ROD].  In their FERC petition, the wind-facility owners cited the 
Final ROD’s $50 million figure, arguing that they could not otherwise accurately estimate the 
financial cost of the BPA’s policy.  Complaint & Petition for Order Under Federal Power 
Act Section 211A against Bonneville Power Admin. Requesting Fast Track Processing at 
4, 66, Iberdola Renewables Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin. (F.E.R.C. 2011), available at 
http://www.bpa.gov/Projects/Initiatives/Oversupply/Oversupply Documents/OtherDocs/2011-
06-13_ ComplaintAgainstBPA.pdf.  However, in footnote 99 of its 2011 ruling, FERC 
noted: 
Other evidence suggests that the actual loss in 2011 may have been much 
lower.  Bonneville has indicated that the value of applicable RECs is $16/MWh 
and the value of PTCs is $37/MWh and that, because only 29 percent of the 
wind fleet receives PTCs, the weighted average value of PTCs and RECs is 
$22/MWh . . . Since the Petition was filed, we have learned that, between May 
18 [sic] and July 10, 2011, Bonneville invoked its [policy] to redispatch a total 
of 97,577 MWh of wind generation, which equals 5.4 percent of the 
1,760,905 MWh of power produced by wind generators in the Bonneville 
Balancing Authority Area during this same period.  Based on this information, 
we estimate that the [policy] resulted in, for 2011, a $2.15 million loss in RECs 
and PTCs to wind resources. 
Iberdrola, 137 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,185, at para. 63, n. 99. 
 118. Iberdrola, 137 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,185, at para. 63.  Interestingly, after listing the 
multiple economic consequences of the BPA’s redispatch policy, the Commission stated 
that the wind-facility owners had demonstrated—“[r]egardless of the magnitude of the 
loss”—that the BPA’s policy caused noncomparable transmission service.  Id. 
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redispatch policy.119  Furthermore, the Commission declined to address 
whether the appropriate resolution to the high-volume runoff problem is 
for the BPA to pay negative hydropower prices.120  The BPA is subject 
to a myriad of statutory obligations, which FERC confirmed included an 
obligation to provide comparable transmission service that is not unduly 
discriminatory pursuant to section 211A.121  But how the BPA’s OATT 
should “reconcile” these “numerous rules and regulations” is a question 
that FERC left for the BPA to answer.122  But leaving that question to the 
transmission provider is problematic when that provider does not own all 
of the generating resources that it manages; the transmission provider is 
then in a position to make a cost allocation decision that favors its own 
interests over other parties’ interests. 
3.  Interconnection Agreements and E-Tags 
Aside from its primary determination that the BPA’s redispatch policy 
results in non-comparable transmission service in violation of section 
211A, FERC also determined two other issues: whether the BPA can 
rely on provisions in its interconnection agreements to unilaterally curtail 
wind during high-volume runoff,123 and whether the BPA must update e-
tags when it does curtail wind.124 
With respect to the parties’ interconnection agreements, the Commission 
rejected the BPA’s claims that certain contractual provisions supported 
its use of the redispatch policy.125  FERC determined that any service 
 119. Id. at para. 65. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See id. 
 123. Id. at para. 68. 
 124. Id. at para. 74, 76.  E-tags are the verification tool used to track energy generated 
from renewable sources from production until consumption in order to ensure that the 
renewable energy credits associated with that energy are not sold more than once for 
purposes of complying with an RPS. 
 125. Id. at para. 73.  The wind generators had argued that, while the parties’ 
agreements contained force majeure clauses, the BPA failed to demonstrate that high-
volume runoff constituted an emergency supporting use of the redispatch policy, which 
effectively unilaterally modified executed agreements.  Id. at para. 71 (citing Article 
16.1.1, Force Majeure, of interconnection agreements).  Furthermore, they argued that 
the BPA was precluded from unilateral, uncompensated curtailment by its contractual 
obligations to perform in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, reliability 
standards, and “Good Utility Practice.”  Id. at para. 67 (citing Article 4.3, Performance 
Standards, of interconnection agreements).  In addition to arguing that force majeure 
indeed supports its redispatch policy, the BPA cited another provision that authorized it 
to “‘interrupt or reduce deliveries if such delivery of electricity could adversely affect 
[its] ability to perform such activities as are necessary to safely and reliably operate and 
maintain the Transmission System’ and where required by ‘Good Utility Practice.’”  Id. 
at para. 72 (citing Articles 16.1.1 and 9.7.2 of interconnection agreements). 
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interruptions authorized by the agreements must be performed according 
to “Good Utility Practice,” which necessarily includes compliance with 
applicable statutory obligations—including providing comparable 
transmission service under section 211A.126  With respect to force majeure, 
FERC again set aside the BPA’s past curtailment, ruling only that the 
BPA cannot rely on force majeure in the future unless it could demonstrate 
that circumstances squarely fall within that provision127 and that its 
curtailment no longer causes the non-comparable service struck down by 
this ruling.128  Notably, albeit in a footnote, FERC questioned whether 
force majeure could ever be available to high-volume runoff when the 
BPA predicts a “one-in-three chance of flows at least as high as those of 
early June 2010 occurring in any year and lasting for one month or 
more.”129 
With respect to e-tags, the Commission acknowledged the wind 
industry’s concerns that the BPA’s failure to update e-tags upon curtailment 
resulted in inconsistent grid flow patterns and impacted the wind generators’ 
accounting of environmental credits.130  FERC also acknowledged the 
wind industry’s request for additional time to collaborate with the BPA 
and other stakeholders on a “constructive resolution” to the e-tag issue.131  
Nonetheless, FERC instructed the BPA to update e-tags “to the extent 
that [it] changes the source of a point-to-point transaction (e.g., substituting 
hydropower for wind power).”132 
Although the Commission did not address whether a transmission 
provider may appropriately choose curtailment instead of negative pricing 
to resolve over-generation concerns in its non-comparability determination, 
its determinations on the issues of interconnection agreements and e-tags 
provide some insight on this key question.  For example, by tying the 
choice of unilateral curtailment of generation to the performance standards 
in the interconnection agreements, and then confirming that such standards 
 126. Iberdrola, 137 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,185, at para. 73. 
 127. Id.  Article 16.1.1 defines force majeure as “‘any order, regulation or restriction 
imposed by governmental, military or lawfully established civilian authorities, or any 
other cause beyond a Party’s control.’”  Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at para. 73, n. 110 (citing BPA’s Answer). 
 130. Id. at para. 74 (Wind industry proponents had argued that the BPA’s failure to 
update e-tags when it curtailed wind could create “false signals” that created reliability 
concerns and impacted “proper accounting for environmental credits.”). 
 131. Id. at para. 75. 
 132. Id. at para. 76. 
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inherently include comparable service, FERC attaches a consequence to 
the policy choice that remains the BPA’s to make: if you choose curtailment, 
it must be comparably implemented.  The question is then whether 
reimbursement for displacement is, indeed, comparable service in times 
of curtailment. 
D.  Round 2: The Oversupply Management Protocol (OMP) 
In March 2012, the BPA complied with the FERC’s ruling by revising 
its redispatch policy to the “Oversupply Management Protocol” 
(“OMP”).133  Under the OMP, the BPA would continue to unilaterally 
curtail nonfederal generation during high-volume runoff, but it would 
now compensate the wind-facility owners for lost tax credits and REC 
revenues.134  This section discusses the OMP protocol and the wind 
generators’ most recent FERC petition, focusing on new arguments brought 
in the wake of the rejected redispatch policy. 
1.  Unilateral Curtailment by Another Name? 
Under BPA’s policy, all participating facilities with a nameplate 
generating capacity of three megawatts or greater are subject to the OMP.135  
Generators that wish to be reimbursed for displacement costs—i.e., wind 
facilities seeking compensation for lost tax credits and revenues due to 
curtailment during high-volume runoff—must affirmatively opt in and 
provide, in advance, fact-specific displacement cost data.136  Generators 
that do not opt in “will be displaced at $0 and will not be subject to cost 
allocation.”137  Additionally, the BPA will assume a displacement cost of 
$0 for generators that fail to submit displacement cost information 
specific to each facility.138  Those determined to be zero-cost appear to 
be the BPA’s “voluntary” generators, first in line for displacement.139  
Generators have been locked into their election as of April 4, 2012.140 
 133. OMP, supra note 45, at 1.  According to version 2 of the OMP, the protocol 
became effective on March 31, 2012, and terminated on March 30, 2013.  Id.  Version 3 
of the OMP was released on April 2, 2013 as this Article went to press, so Version 3 was 
unavailable in time for any analysis or discussion here. 
 134. Id. at 4 
 135. Id. at 1. 
 136. Id. at 1–2. 
 137. Id. at 2. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See id. at 2, 4. 
 140. Id. at 2.  The BPA also offers generators the opportunity to make advance 
arrangements that would waive “In-Kind Real Power Loss Return obligations to reduce 
spill.”  Id. at 2–3. 
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The OMP utilizes a least-cost displacement regime, wherein over-
generating non-variable energy resources are first subject to reduction 
and, only if further reduction is required, over-generating variable-energy 
resources (i.e., wind) will then be subject to reduction.141  Thus, in the 
event of high-volume runoff, the BPA would first invoke mitigation 
measures to ensure federal hydropower generation minimizes its 
environmental impact.142  If such measures require nonfederal reduction 
(i.e., curtailment), the BPA will approach non-federal generating resources 
to make advance displacement offers.143  First, it will approach thermal 
generators.144  The BPA will not approach wind generators unless further 
reduction is needed, and, at that time, it would first approach those wind 
facilities that require the least cost to displace.145 
2.  The Debate Renewed 
Shortly after the BPA issued the OMP, the wind generators filed 
another petition with FERC, requesting an interim order precluding the 
BPA from implementing the OMP until the Commission has issued a 
determination on the merits.146  The wind generators argue that the BPA 
failed to comply with the Commission’s 2011 ruling, because the OMP 
 141. Id. at 2.  Radford provides a helpful summary: 
Bonneville would assign a zero displacement cost to thermal units, but allow 
them to satisfy minimum run and ramping requirements.  With curtailments of 
non-federal resources occurring in least-cost sequence, BPA would displace 
thermal units first, before forcing wind power off the system so as to create 
unserved load as a market for its surplus hydropower. 
Bruce W. Radford, It’s the Money, Not the Fish, 150 PUB. UTIL. FORT., no. 7, 2012 at 24, 
25.  And, with respect to wind power curtailment, “BPA would first curtail those wind 
plants needing the least amount of compensation to be made whole.”  Id. at 24. 
 142. OMP, supra note 45, at 2. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 4. 
 145. Id.  In other words, the BPA would first displace those wind generators who 
opted out or failed to submit displacement cost data—the “voluntary” generators who 
can be displaced at zero-cost to the BPA (but not zero-cost to the wind generators).  
Voluntary displacers who fail to reduce generation in compliance with the OMP would 
be subject to penalties.  Id. at 5. 
 146. Protest & Limited Motion for Expedited Order Staying Implementation of 
Tariff Amendment of Nw. & Intermountain Power Prod. Coalition & Transalta Energy 
Mktg., Iberdrola Renewables, Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., (F.E.R.C. 2012) (Docket No. 
EL11-44-002), available at http://www.nippc.org/upload/ Comments%20on%20BPA’s 
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is not a complete OATT147 and because it otherwise fails to provide 
comparable transmission service that is not unduly discriminatory under 
section 211A.148  The 2012 petition argues that the BPA should instead 
manage its oversupply by selling federal hydropower at prices sufficient 
to induce other generators to voluntarily displace generation—via “FPS-
12, Firm Power Products and Services Rate,”149 which the wind generators 
argue can achieve the same environmental protection as the OMP but 
without the cost protection of federal hydropower.150 
 147. For the wind generators’ arguments in this regard, see id. at 9–14.  This section 
will focus on comparability. 
 148. Id. at 1. While FERC at one time ordered the BPA to file “tariff revisions,” the 
Commission had in other sections noted that this should be a revised OATT, see 
Iberdrola, 137 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,185, at paras. 66, 78.  But the wind industry notably 
characterizes the FERC’s ruling as precluding the BPA from displacing nonfederal 
generation with federal hydropower during over-generation events.  2012 Petition, supra 
note 146, at 1.  The 2011 ruling could also be read as instructing the BPA to ensure that, 
if it chooses curtailment, such protocol is comparable for federal and nonfederal 
generating sources.  The wind industry’s argument being, then, that the OMP is non-
comparable because its least-cost displacement regime does not apply to federal 
generators—displacement is still a one-way street. 
The wind generators also argue that the BPA’s compliance filing must be rejected 
because the BPA failed to obtain a FERC declaratory order that the OMP is just, 
reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory or preferential, pursuant to a regulation 
applicable to the BPA’s existing tariff.  2012 Petition, supra note 146, at 27–28 (citing 
18 CFR § 35.28(e)). 
 149. 2012 Petition, supra note 146, at 1–2.  The FPS-12 allows for a “flexible rate”: 
“[d]emand and/or energy charges shall be as specified by BPA or as mutually agreed by 
BPA and the Customer. . . . ”  Id. at Att. A. 
 150. Id. at 4.  Specifically, the wind generators argue: 
This is the heart of the matter: the negative pricing flexibility in Bonneville’s 
FPS-12 Rate can produce the same protection of fish and reliability as the 
Oversupply Management Protocol, but it might result in higher negative prices 
paid to non-Federal generators.  Bonneville apparently rejects competitive 
power markets.  Bonneville’s dislike for the existing solution, however, does 
not render the solution unworkable.  It is simply not appropriate for Bonneville 
to ignore the Commission’s directive, and implement a new (and clearly non-
comparable) transmission regime, prior to the Commission’s opportunity to vet 
the issues, just because Bonneville finds the remaining alternatives distasteful. 
Id.  The BPA had argued: 
Bonneville does not believe paying negative prices to moderate TDG [Total 
Dissolved Gas] levels will result in a well functioning market. . . . Bonneville 
needs to generate power in order to moderate TDG levels and cannot make a 
rational economic choice whether or not to accept any particular price for its 
power.  As a result, marketers will be able to charge any price for accepting 
Bonneville’s power.  In addition, thermal generators will likely hold out for 
negatively priced power once Bonneville begins paying negative prices.  
Bonneville does not believe other entities should be allowed to profit in this 
manner at Bonneville’s expense when Bonneville must comply with its 
environmental responsibilities. 
BPA’s Response to comments, supra note 46, at 6.  There is a real risk of market 
manipulation under the conditions that BPA outlines, so a strong market monitor and 
regulatory force would be necessary to assure such manipulation did not occur.  The 
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The wind generators argue that the OMP is the redispatch policy under 
another name, because the same “non-comparable” results occur: involuntary 
displacement; direct, negative impact on nonfederal transmission service; 
and an inability to satisfy renewable portfolio standards.151  In other words, 
the BPA continues to provide non-comparable and unduly discriminatory 
service to nonfederal generators, regardless of the fact that it would now 
reimburse displacement costs.152  Notably, the wind generators submit 
that displacement payments under the OMP, while characterized by the 
BPA as reimbursing renewable generators for losses due to necessary 
displacement, would actually establish new, reduced rates.153  Thus, the 
wind generators argue, the BPA does engage in negative pricing—even 
though the BPA claims that the OMP is a necessary alternative to an 
unsustainable strategy of paying negative hydropower prices.154  “[T]he 
only difference between comparable transmission service that is not 
unduly discriminatory or preferential and the [OMP] is the risk that 
Bonneville might incur higher costs in market purchses [sic] at negative 
prices than under the [OMP.]”155 
entire Pacific Northwest is still reeling from the price shocks that propagated across the 
region during the California energy crisis in 2000–2001, so BPA is understandably wary.  
See Duane, supra note 19. 
 151. 2012 Petition, supra note 146, at 14–15. 
 152. Id. at 15. 
 153. Id. at 18–20.  The wind generators point to a Ninth Circuit case, which held 
that the BPA effectuated the sale of its power at a new, reduced rate when it purchased 
Trojan nuclear plant’s scheduling rights—enabling the BPA to shut the plan down and 
replace nuclear power with BPA power.  Cal. Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm. 
v. Bonneville Power Admin., 754 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1985).  “[P]roviding displacement 
energy at the FPS-12 Rate of 0 mills per kilowatt hours, plus payment of non-Federal, 
renewable generators’ displacement costs, is exactly like charging for Trojan replacement 
energy costs at an established rate, plus payment of a fee for scheduling rights.  The 
combination is an effective rate.”  2012 Petition, supra note 146, at 20–21. 
 154. 2012 Petition, supra note 146, at 18. 
 155. Id.  The 2012 petition contains many other arguments from which we may 
develop key concerns for other transmission system providers, whether classified as an 
RTO, ISO, or a utility.  For example, the wind generators argue that the OMP’s requirement 
that renewable generators submit displacement costs in advance is unrealistic.  Id. at 22.  
Because generators must market power and RECs in real time, in a market that is 
constantly in flux, they argue that FERC should require the BPA to update its cost curve 
within 24 hours of revised data submitted by an individual generator.  Id. at 22–23.  
Similarly, wind generators argue that generators must be entitled to establish minimum 
generation levels and maximum ramp rates as necessary to efficiently operate their 
plants.  Id. at 25. While these arguments likely do reflect the reality of a volatile real-
time renewable energy market, it is not clear how far such arguments would go, given 
the new FERC Order No. 764 on variable energy resources integration to take effect in 
June 2013. See News Release, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, supra note 14; see also 
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E.  Policy Ramifications of the BPA-Wind Dispute 
It is unclear how persuasive the wind generators’ new legal arguments 
brought against the OMP may be.  After analyzing the key legal issues 
with respect to the BPA’s redispatch policy and new arguments brought 
against the OMP, however, we believe we have an implicit answer to the 
question that FERC apparently declined to address—namely, whether a 
transmission provider can unilaterally curtail a class of generation and 
still comply with the comparable service requirements of section 211A.  
Over-generation will inevitably occur, be it due to federal hydropower 
because of high-volume runoff or solar power because of record drought.  
An OATT must account for this eventual occurrence.  And curtailment 
of one class of generators is just one potential resolution to the over-
generation problem.  However, any protocol that seeks to reduce generation 
on the grid inherently impacts those generators’ transmission rights and, 
therefore, that protocol must be comparable and not unduly discriminatory.  
Transmission providers can no longer treat over-generation as an 
unforeseeable, emergency situation that justifies non-comparable, unilateral 
curtailment of a class of generators—especially one whose variability 
renders it more unreliable and, seemingly, expendable.  Exactly how 
curtailment can be comparably implemented, however, is another question.  
How does reimbursing displacement ensure comparable transmission 
service when, in the case of the BPA, federal hydropower is never displaced 
by variable-energy generation? 
Moreover, how will we reduce the total system costs of integration in 
the absence of curtailment—and how will we allocate the costs of 
renewable integration within the hybrid regulatory structure?  The real 
driver of integration conflict—including the BPA-wind curtailment 
conflict—is money. How much will each stakeholder group have to pay?  
BPA and its customers do not want to fund California’s RPS by spilling 
BPA hydro, thereby possibly increasing total system costs and therefore 
rates for BPA’s customers.  But BPA’s DSO 216 curtailment policy fails 
to account for REC and PTC income lost by wind operators; BPA would 
not spill the wind if BPA owned it.  We therefore need an institutional 
structure, including both the state and federal regulatory systems, and 
incentives, including RPS criteria and PPAs, to allocate the costs 
of renewable integration as a regular and foreseeable cost of operating 
modern transmission systems. 
Radford, supra note 75, at 27 (discussing whether negative prices are really subsidies, 
which BPA has now chosen to pay to wind industry); see Ben Tansey, BPA Oversupply 
Management Protocol Still Looking for Love, NORTHWEST FISHLETTER (Apr. 19, 2012), 
http://www.newsdata.com/fishletter/302/8story.html (discussing subsidy argument in part, 
including whether BPA has authority to make such payments). 
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Fortunately, there are a number of policy strategies that can be adopted to 
reduce the total system costs of integrating high levels of renewable 
generation.  Part IV outlines the most promising strategies and discusses 
how they could lower integration costs.  Part V then discusses the difficult 
policy choice of allocating those integration costs. 
IV.  STRATEGIES TO REDUCE THE COST OF INTEGRATING              
RENEWABLES 
The challenge of integrating high levels of renewable generation is now 
firmly on the agenda of a wide range of stakeholders and governing 
institutions in the electricity sector.  The issue has moved beyond academic 
and scholarly debate, generating extensive technical studies by the National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), North American Electric 
Reliability Corporation (NERC), and Western Electricity Coordinating 
Council (WECC).  Both technical studies and policy initiatives have been 
conducted and initiated by FERC, the Western Governors’ Association 
(WGA), BPA, CAISO, the California Energy Commission (CEC), the 
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), and other state regulatory 
agencies. International analyses of integrating high levels of renewables, 
especially in Europe, also offer important insights into how to integrate 
renewables most cost-effectively. 
The consistent theme in these analyses is that the technical challenge 
of integration can be overcome but that integration may incur significant 
economic costs unless institutional reforms are adopted.  We believe the 
WGA report,156 which was released in June 2012, is the most comprehensive 
assessment to date and offers the clearest set of policy initiatives to reduce 
the cost of integrating renewables and maintain a reliable western electricity 
grid.  In this Part, we summarize the recommendations of the WGA report 
and discuss how many of the strategies are complementary and would 
dramatically reduce the cost of integration. 
The WGA Report agrees with our assertion that “[i]ntegration is not 
an issue that is unique to renewable resources; conventional forms of 
generation also impose generation costs.”157  The challenge of integration is 
especially complex in the West, however, where there are 37 interconnecting 
 156. W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, MEETING RENEWABLE 
ENERGY TARGETS IN THE WEST AT LEAST COST: THE INTEGRATION CHALLENGE (2012) 
[hereinafter WGA REPORT]. 
 157. Id. at ES-2. 
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BAs.158  Some of those BAs are ISOs or RTOs; others (including BPA) 
want to avoid FERC regulation as an RTO for a variety of institutional 
reasons.  Coordinating consistent policies across the vast geographic 
scale and institutional complexity of the WECC grid is therefore more 
challenging than in tighter, more closely-coordinated regions where 
RTOs or ISOs exist such as the PJM Interconnection,159 ISO-New England 
(ISO-NE),160 or the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT).161  
Each of the latter regions has more similarity among their members than 
the WECC and has experience with complex and sophisticated markets, 
so it has been easier to get agreement on policy.  The RTO/ISO structures 
also give FERC more direct authority over those BAs and their generation 
and integration policies, although FERC’s definition of the BPA dispute 
as a transmission conflict allowed FERC to exercise jurisdiction over 
BPA’s curtailment policies. 
The WGA report identifies nine strategies to reduce renewable integration 
costs: 
1.  Expand Subhourly Dispatch and Scheduling 
2.  Facilitate Dynamic Transfers Between Balancing Authorities 
3.  Implement an Energy Imbalance Market 
4.  Improve Weather, Wind, and Solar Forecasting 
5.  Take Advantage of Geographic Diversity of Resources 
6.  Improve Reserves Management 
7.  Retool Demand Response to Complement Variable Generation 
8.  Access Greater Flexibility in the Dispatch of Existing Generating Plants 
9.  Focus on Flexibility for New Generating Plants 
We summarize and discuss each of these strategies in this Part.  Our 
overview is only a summary of the key considerations for each strategy, 
so we strongly recommend that policy-makers read the entire 128-page 
 158. 20 of these 37 BAs are now involved in the Northwest Power Pool, which 
covers all or part of seven U.S. states and two Canadian provinces.  Id. at 2. 
 159. Originally comprised of utilities in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland 
(PJM); PJM now includes utilities in 13 states in the mid-Atlantic region and Midwest: 
all or parts of Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, 
North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia and the District 
of Columbia.  The PJM region has an area of 214,000 square miles, a population of 
about 60 million and a peak demand of 163,848 megawatts. See PJM–Territory Served, 
PJM.COM, http://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/who-we-are/territory-served.aspx (last visited 
Dec. 21, 2012). 
 160. The New England regional electric power system serves 14 million people 
living in a 68,000 square-mile area with a peak demand of just over 28,000 MW.  It 
includes all of the states of Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
Vermont, and Maine.  ISO NEW ENGLAND, 2012 REGIONAL SYSTEM PLAN 23–24 (2012) 
 161. ERCOT manages the flow of electric power to 23 million Texas customers (85 
percent of the state’s electric load).  Electric Reliability Council of Tex., About ERCOT,  
ELECTRIC RELIABILITY COUNCIL OF TEX., http://www.ercot.com/about/ (last visited Dec. 
21, 2012).  Like CAISO (and unlike PJM or ISO-NE), ERCOT operates only within a 
single state—giving state regulators a greater regulatory role. 
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WGA Report in order to understand the subtleties and nuances of each 
policy recommendation.  The full WGA Report includes important figures 
and tables as well as working examples of particular strategies or pilot 
projects to test the strategies.  Our purpose is to illustrate the suite of 
strategies and policy initiatives that are necessary to minimize renewable 
integration costs while simultaneously promoting incentives for the 
development of a robust, resilient, and reliable electricity grid.  Such a 
grid must be able to accommodate the technologically and geographically 
diverse set of renewable generation technologies necessary to meet 
environmental policy goals.  No single strategy is sufficient, and most 
strategies are likely to be much more effective if other strategies are also 
implemented.  The nine strategies, and their sub-options, are therefore 
complementary rather than competitive. 
Each of the “integration actions” described in the WGA Report has 
different expected costs, expected benefits, and projected timeframes to 
implement the option.  The expected costs and benefits are characterized 
as “low” (less than $10 million region-wide), “medium” (between $10 
million and $100 million), or “high” (more than $100 million).  The 
projected timeframe is either “short” (less than two years), “medium” 
(two to five years), or “long” (more than five years).162  We summarize 
that assessment of costs, benefits, and projected timeframes at the end of 
each strategy and sub-option below. 
A.  Expand Subhourly Dispatch and Scheduling 
The WGA makes an important distinction between economic dispatch 
(“the process of maximizing the output of the least-cost generating units 
in response to changing loads”) and scheduling (“the advance scheduling 
of energy on the transmission grid”).163  The temporal variability of many 
renewables (e.g., wind, photovoltaic solar with partially cloudy conditions) 
results in a greater need to dispatch resources on a sub-hourly basis and 
to schedule transmission capacity on a sub-hourly basis.  Otherwise, 
dispatchers would need to ramp other generating resources up or down 
while facing either underutilization or oversubscription for transmission 
services.  The result is economically inefficient and imposes higher 
 162. The methods and assumptions used in the WGA Report’s assessment of 
integration actions are described in Appendix A and summarized on page ES-3 of the 
WGA Report.  WGA REPORT, supra note 156, at ES-3, app. A. 
 163. Id. at ES-4. 
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integration costs than would occur with sub-hourly generation dispatch 
and sub-hourly scheduling. 
Only two of the 37 BAs in the West, CAISO and Alberta, regularly 
use sub-hourly dispatch and scheduling today.  The intra-hour dispatch 
and scheduling frequency may be every 5 minutes, every 15 minutes, 
every 30 minutes, or every 30 minutes scheduled only once each hour at 
the top of the hour.  The norm—and the pro forma OATT under FERC 
Order No. 890—remains hourly scheduling with sub-hourly dispatch.  
Shifting to sub-hourly scheduling would reduce conflict over transmission 
system access as well as the economic costs of integration.  BPA has 
been experimenting with sub-hourly dispatch and scheduling, including 
a pilot project with CAISO from October 2011 through September 2012 
for up to 400 MW between the BAs.164 
WGA notes that “[a] system-wide regime including dispatch, scheduling, 
balancing and settlement—all implemented at the same shorter time 
interval—yields the maximum benefits.”165  Moreover, “integration studies 
estimating the benefits of intra-hour transmission scheduling assume 
implementation would be mandatory and bundled with sub-hourly dispatch, 
balancing and settlement.  Expected benefits of intra-hour transmission 
scheduling could be significantly lower in the absence of these requirements.”  
Therefore, “[o]ptional 15-minute transmission scheduling as a stand-
alone product may not result in significant reductions in overall system 
reserve requirements.”166 
Sub-hourly dispatch and Intra-hour scheduling is broken down into 
three options: 
1. Non-standard, voluntary, not West-wide, with 30-minute intervals (low 
cost, low benefit, short timeframe). 
2. Standard, voluntary, not West-wide, with 5 to 15 minute intervals (low to 
medium cost, low to medium benefit, short timeframe). 
3. Standard, required, West-wide, with unspecified intervals (low to high 
cost, medium to high benefit, medium timeframe). 
As discussed in Part V, FERC Order No. 764 requires sub-hourly 
scheduling on a 15-minute basis beginning in June 2013.  FERC therefore 
took action on the first WGA recommendation the same month it was 
released in June 2012. We discuss the adequacy of Order No. 764 in Part 
V. 
 164. Id. at 6–8. 
 165. Id. at 11. 
 166. Id. at 18, n. 57. 
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B.  Facilitate Dynamic Transfers Between Balancing Authorities 
Dynamic transfer involves “electronically transferring generation from 
the balancing authority area in which it physically resides to another 
balancing authority area in real-time.  Such transfers allow generation to 
be located and controlled in a geographic location that is outside of the 
receiving balancing authority area.”167  In essence, it gives one BA that 
is consuming the power (e.g., CAISO) control over the operation of the 
generating plant even though the plant is in a different BA (e.g., BPA).  
This shifts the responsibility for managing the variability of generating 
output to the consuming BA, but it also requires the source BA to keep 
transmission open “for maximum dynamic flow that could occur within 
the scheduling period.”168  Moreover, dynamic transfers also increase power 
and voltage fluctuations, which “are more difficult to manage as more 
dynamic transfers have large and frequent ramps [i.e., dramatic changes 
in output, either up or down] within the scheduling period.”169  These 
concerns over control, the opportunity costs of potentially unused 
transmission capacity, and power or voltage fluctuations have limited 
the use of dynamic transfers.170 
The benefits of dynamic transfers—especially if transmission investments 
can be made to reduce the risks of power and voltage fluctuation while 
expanding the capacity for such transfers—relate primarily to the 
increased diversity of generating resources from other BAs and increased 
operational flexibility associated with the aggregated demand and 
generating resource mix of multiple BAs.  Some of the renewable resources 
located in other BAs are also likely to be lower-cost than generating 
resources within the consuming BA, so expanding dynamic transfers 
could lower overall generating costs (whether they would lower total 
system costs depends on the cost of transmission investments, though.)  
 167. Id. at ES-5. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. An out-of-state generator with dynamic transfer qualifies the resource to meet 
the California RPS under the most desirable category, so there are many generators who 
would like BPA to give CAISO more dynamic transfer authority for exports from the 
BPA BA to CAISO. See CA PUB UTIL. CODE § 399.16(b)(1).  One wind generator in the 
BPA BA (Public Utility District No. 1 of Cowlitz County) has challenged this provision 
of the California RPS requiring dynamic transfer (and the unlikelihood of getting it) as a 
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. Daniel K. Lee and Timothy P. Duane, Putting the 
Dormant Commerce Clause Back to Sleep: Adapting the Doctrine to Support State 
Renewable Portfolio Standards, ENVTL. L. (forthcoming 2013). 
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Dynamic transfers have been used by utilities for decades, but the 
transfers have generally involved less variable generating resources and 
have followed hourly, rather than sub-hourly, scheduling and dispatch. 
CAISO has accommodated dynamic transfers at a sub-hourly time 
scale,171 but its three interties with BPA each have different limits on 
dynamic transfers that constrain overall use of the option.172  A recent 
Joint Initiative Dynamic Scheduling System has been experimenting 
with dynamic transfers throughout the west since 2009, with 18 entities 
involved by October 2011.173  The Joint Initiative has specifically been 
studying how to facilitate expanded dynamic transfers of wind generation 
from the Pacific Northwest to CAISO since October 2010 and has 
developed preliminary options for enhancing transfer variability limits.174  
Those options are primarily technical, rather than institutional, fixes and 
require significant investments to increase the technical capabilities of 
the transmission system.  Determining who shall pay for those investments 
remains a sticking point, however, and it is the primary impediment to 
implementing the technical changes. 
Dynamic Transfers are broken into two alternatives in the option 
assessment: 
1. Improved tools and operating procedures (low cost, low to medium 
benefit, short to medium timeframe). 
2. Equipment upgrades, including new transmission lines (medium to 
high cost, medium to high benefit, short to medium timeframe). 
C.  Implement an Energy Imbalance Market 
Perhaps the most important—and controversial—option considered in 
the WGA Report is the implementation of a region-wide Energy 
Imbalance Market (EIM).  An EIM “is a centralized market mechanism 
that would enable dispatch of generation and transmission resources 
across balancing authority areas (BAs) to resolve energy imbalances—
differences between generation and demand.”175  The WGA Report’s 
rationale for an EIM is worth quoting at length: 
As proposed for the Western U.S., an EIM is a centralized market mechanism 
to: 
1. re-dispatch generation every five minutes to maintain load and 
resource balance, addressing generator schedule deviations and load 
forecast errors and 
 171. WGA REPORT, supra note 156, at 23, 26–27. 
 172. Id. at 23, 28–29. 
 173. Id. at 24. 
 174. Id. at 30. 
 175. Id. at 32 (emphasis in original). 
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2. provide congestion management service by re-dispatching generation 
to relieve grid constraints. 
An EIM would increase the efficiency and flexibility of system operations to 
integrate higher levels of wind and solar resources by enabling dispatch of 
generation and transmission resources across balancing authorities.  That would 
harness the full diversity of load and generation in a broad geographic area to 
resolve energy imbalances.  An EIM would optimize the dispatch of imbalance 
energy within transmission constraints, reducing operating costs and reserve needs 
and making more efficient use of the transmission system.  In addition, an EIM 
would provide reliability benefits by coordinating balancing across the region, 
making more generation available to system operators.176 
In essence, an EIM takes advantage of the portfolio effect on both 
supply and demand: by having access to a more diverse aggregate set of 
generating resources and load, costs can be lowered while maintaining 
reliability.  Studies by the NREL show significant potential benefits from a 
regional EIM with 30% wind penetration.  Reduced reserve requirements 
would save $221 million per year if implemented across the entire West 
(excluding CAISO and Alberta).  The benefits drop to $144 million per year 
if implemented without BPA and the Western Area Power Administration 
(WAPA), which is the federal marketing agent for other hydropower 
generated from federal facilities on the Colorado River and elsewhere 
outside the Pacific Northwest.177  Another study commissioned by WECC 
estimated projected annual benefits of $141 million in 2020.178 
Achieving such savings entails some risks, however, with an uneven 
distribution of benefits and costs among the BAs in the West.  “Concerns 
have been raised that market manipulation could lead to costs outweighing 
potential benefits of an EIM,” notes the WGA Report, so “[a] market 
monitor would be needed to ensure that no abusive scheduling or market 
manipulation practices occur.”179  Governance structure then becomes 
central to such an EIM.  Many of the BAs in the West are resistant to 
participation in an RTO or ISO structure, because those BAs believe that 
doing so would give away too much control over both their operations 
and their authority to control rates.  In essence, establishing an EIM 
would shift electrical utility operations further from a cost-of-service or 
 176. Id. at ES-6. 
 177. Id. at 37 (citing J. KING, ET. AL., FLEXIBILITY RESERVE REDUCTIONS FROM AN 
ENERGY IMBALANCE MARKET WITH HIGH LEVELS OF WIND ENERGY IN THE WESTERN 
INTERCONNECTION, NREL REP. NO. TP-5500-52330 (2011), available at http://www. 
nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/52330.pdf.). 
 178. WGA REPORT, supra note 156, at 36–37. 
 179. Id. at 34. 
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rate-of-return regulatory structure toward more of a market-based rate 
and economic recovery model.  Understandably, many utilities (and their 
customers) with relatively low rates and strong expected rate stability are 
nervous about such a shift.  They fear an EIM throughout the West would 
expose them to the types of wholesale market manipulation and rate 
shocks that propagated throughout the West during the California 
Energy Crisis of 2000-2001.180 
Despite these concerns—or, perhaps, because of these concerns—the 
Northwest Power Pool Market Assessment and Coordination Committee 
has brought together twenty BAs in the West along with several other 
utilities to evaluate the costs and benefits of an EIM.181  State public 
utilities commissions also organized a PUC EIM Group in November 
2011 to study the benefits and costs of an EIM throughout the region.182  
Politically, those BAs and PUCs probably have the power to prevent FERC 
(or Congress) from compelling an EIM throughout the WECC.  And 
those BAs and PUCs are unlikely to support a region-wide EIM unless 
the issue of integration cost allocation is resolved with clarity in a way 
that they believe is fair to them. 
The WGA explicitly addresses whether an EIM would lead to an RTO 
or ISO structure and wholesale energy markets by conditioning what an 
EIM would entail:183 
     An EIM would not be a full wholesale energy market.  It would not include a 
day ahead market, coordinated unit commitment, financial transmission rights 
or an ancillary services market.  Also, an EIM would not eliminate existing 
transmission arrangements.  Under an EIM, entities may continue current practices 
for obtaining transmission service, such as reserving and entering into long-term 
contracts for firm point-to-point and network transmission service. 
     The EIM proposal would not establish an RTO or a consolidated regional 
network transmission tariff.  The EIM governance documents could include 
provisions that would allow expansion of functions only with unanimous or 
supermajority agreement.  While FERC would have jurisdiction to determine 
that EIM rates, terms and conditions are just and reasonable, that would not 
cause EIM participants to become jurisdictional themselves. 
     To avoid RTO characteristics or status, the EIM should not provide 
transmission service or control transmission facilities owned by others and 
should not have an OATT.  Participating transmission providers would retain 
their own OATTs with modifications to integrate their activities with the EIM.  
Each transmission owner could add an EIM transmission service and rate to its 
OATT that conforms to a common, agreed upon approach requiring FERC 
approval. 
 180. Duane, supra note 19. 
 181. WGA REPORT, supra note 156, at 41. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 33–34. 
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Energy Imbalance Markets are broken into two alternatives in the option 
assessment: 
1. Subregion only (medium to high cost, medium benefit, medium 
timeframe). 
2. West-wide (medium to high cost, high benefit, medium to long 
timeframe). 
D.  Improve Weather, Wind, and Solar Forecasting 
“Weather is a primary influence on all electric systems as it drives 
load demand, in addition to variable generation sources such as wind and 
solar,” notes the WGA.  “Thus, forecasting of variable generation should 
be viewed in the broader context of weather forecasting.”184  Despite 
these common sources of variability, however, our uncertainty in predicting 
load is now considerably smaller than our uncertainty about wind 
generation: day-ahead forecasting error for load is only 1-3% compared 
to 15-18% for wind energy and 6-8% for wind capacity on a regional 
basis.  Day-ahead forecasting error for a single wind plant is even 
greater, as it would also be for a single customer’s load: day-ahead 
forecasts are off by 25-30% for energy and 10-12% for capacity.  Hour-
ahead wind forecast error is smaller, but still significant: 6-11% for 
regional energy and 3-6% for regional capacity—10-15% for a single 
plant’s energy and 4-6% for its capacity.  Therefore, improving weather, 
wind, and solar forecasts—including adopting state-of-the-art forecasting 
methods already available—has significant value.185 
That value is manifest primarily in reducing the economic costs of 
maintaining reserves.  “Continuing use of and improvements in variable 
generation forecasting will give balancing authorities more confidence in 
the forecasts over time,” states the WGA, “and allow balancing authorities 
to hold lower levels of reserves.”186  Lower reserves mean much lower 
integration costs: NREL has estimated, with 35% wind and solar 
penetration,187 that use of state-of-the art day-ahead variable generation 
forecasting “would reduce annual operating costs in the WECC region 
by up to $5 billion annually” and that “perfect forecasts would reduce 
 184. Id. at ES-7. 
 185. Id. at 46. 
 186. Id. 
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operating costs in WECC by another $500 million” annually.188  Note 
that 90% of the benefits achievable with perfect forecasts would be 
realized simply by adopting existing state-of-the-art forecasting methods.  
Thus, existing methods simply need to be adopted to realize these benefits. 
Improved weather, wind and solar forecasting would have medium 
cost, medium-to-high benefit, and could be implemented in a short to 
medium timeframe.  FERC Order No. 764 requires monitoring and 
reporting that should improve forecasting.  We discuss the adequacy of 
Order No. 764 in Part V. 
E.  Take Advantage of Geographic Diversity of Resources 
As noted in Part II and as demonstrated by the region-versus plant-
specific forecast uncertainty estimates in the previous section, increasing 
geographic diversity is usually associated with reduced variability in 
renewable generation output.  The reason is that “wind and solar projects 
are less correlated and have less variable output in aggregate.”189  This 
reduced correlation “reduces ramping of conventional generation for 
balancing, as well as forecasting errors and the need for balancing (not 
contingency) reserves.”190  However, the benefits of increased geographic 
diversity may be counterbalanced by increased transmission investment 
costs and decreased generator productivity on less resource-rich sites.  
Less productive sites would generally mean both greater environmental 
impacts associated with renewable generation (e.g., more land impacted) 
and higher production costs (excluding any diversity benefits). 
“The question,” states the WGA Report succinctly, “is whether reducing 
aggregate variability of variable generation through geographic diversity, 
with the resulting reductions in reserves requirements and wind and solar 
forecast errors, justifies initiatives such as transmission expansion.”191  
The answer to that question depends on the initial geographic diversity 
of the BA and the degree to which each BA is integrated with other BAs 
(e.g., through Dynamic Transfers, an EIM, or both) to acquire functional 
diversity across the integrated BAs.  “Some regions in the U.S. have large 
balancing authority areas that naturally provide geographic diversity,” 
notes the WGA Report, but “[d]iversity also can be accessed through 
greater balancing authority cooperation, building transmission and 
optimized siting of wind and solar plants.  Siting these resources without 
regard to geographic diversity may have higher [total system] costs 
 188. WGA REPORT, supra note 156, at 48. 
 189. Id. at ES-8. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
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[including integration costs] compared to projects sited to minimize 
transmission costs.”192  On the other hand, “if the resource sites are not 
of equal quality, more wind and solar capacity may be required to achieve 
the same generation output—at higher cost—compared to developing 
higher quality resources that are geographically concentrated.”193 
There is no institutional decision process in today’s hybrid regulatory 
structure where all of these cost considerations—the portfolio benefits of 
reduced variability, the increased transmission costs required to achieve 
increased geographic diversity, and the increased environmental and 
economic costs of siting generation in less resource-rich regions—are 
aggregated to determine which generation and transmission resource mix 
is truly least-cost.194  Instead, each party in the system assesses the costs 
and benefits of individual investments only in terms of those costs and 
benefits borne directly by that party.  With very few exceptions, there are no 
incentives to make transmission or generation investments based on 
minimizing total system cost.  The result, not surprisingly, is a system 
that fails to capture the benefits of diversity and fails to compensate 
those who can provide the benefits of diversity. 
The sources of the BPA-wind conflict are at least in part due to this 
lack of incentives, which translate into a lack of transmission capacity to 
facilitate geographic diversity.  “BPA’s service area is an example of 
wind development concentrating around available transmission,” notes 
WGA.  The result is high vulnerability to a wind “ramping event.”  One 
such event occurred on February 1-2, 2012 when wind production ramped 
up 1,410 MW in just 40 minutes, an increase by 37% of BPA’s installed 
wind capacity.  “Such rapid rises in wind production over a short period 
of time are relatively unusual, but they must be managed with sufficient 
balancing capacity.”195  This then strains the hydropower system and 
other generation available to BPA, which must be backed down to 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Both FERC and state regulatory commissions conduct these analysis when 
considering the public costs and benefits of specific projects that come before them for 
approval (e.g., hydroelectric licenses and transmission lines for FERC, approval of utility 
investments or PPAs for state regulators, permitting decisions by the California Energy 
Commission or other state or federal permitting authorities such as federal land agencies).  
None of those state or federal regulators has authority over the other regulators or private 
parties engaging in market transactions, however, where the distribution of costs and 
benefits will often determine which investments are ultimately built by each party acting 
independently. 
 195. WGA REPORT, supra note 156, at 66. 
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accommodate the wind ramp.  A more typical wind ramp on the BPA 
system occurs over several hours—but wind generation is still highly 
correlated in the BPA system due to the strong Columbia Gorge wind 
resource and transmission constraints. 
High levels of geographic aggregation reduce variability even with 
high levels of renewables penetration.  According to NREL’s analysis 
“WECC-wide, net load variability is actually lower than variability with 
load alone” with 30% wind and solar penetration.  Net load variability is 
much higher for individual states or BAs, however, due to their lower 
levels of geographic diversity affecting both load variability and 
renewable generation variability.196  But benefits of greater geographical 
diversity are unlikely to be realized under the current institutional structure. 
The WGA Report is filled with citations to similar findings from 
smaller-scale studies: a portfolio effect in Arizona that dampens rapid 
wind ramps,197 dramatic reductions in solar photovoltaic output variability 
in California, Nevada, Arizona, Colorado, and Germany,198 and even 
negative integration costs in Montana for dispersed wind generation.199  
Diverse renewables generation, together with diverse loads, can often 
result in net load profiles that are not significantly any more variable than 
the existing load profiles.  In other words, high renewables penetration—
if both technologically and geographically diverse—may not increase the 
technical challenge of managing variability in the electrical system.200  
Technological diversity (e.g., wind combined with hydropower in the 
Pacific Northwest; wind combined with wave energy in Scotland, Ireland, 
 196. Id. at 55 (citing NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY, GE ENERGY, 
WESTERN WIND AND SOLAR INTEGRATION STUDY (2010), available at http://www.nrel. 
gov/wind/systemsintegration/wwsis.html).  A subsequent study by the WECC Variable 
Generation Subcommittee found that improved coordination reduced load following and 
regulation reserve requirements by roughly 50%. WGA REPORT, supra note 156, at 55 
(citing WESTERN ELECTRICITY COORDINATING COUNCIL VARIABLE GENERATION 
SUBCOMMITTEE, ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND VARIABLE GENERATION INTEGRATION, 2012 
ADDENDUM (2012), available at http://www.wecc.biz/committees/StandingCommittees/ 
JGC/VGS/MWG/ActivityM1/2012%20Addendum%20%20Electricity%20Markets%20 
and%20Variable%20Generation%20Integration.pdf). 
 197. WGA REPORT, supra note 156, at 56 (citing NORTHERN ARIZONA UNIVERSITY, 
FINAL REPORT: ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE WIND INTEGRATION COST IMPACT STUDY 
(2007), available at http://www.uwig.org/APS_Wind_Integration_Study_Final9-07.pdf). 
 198. WGA REPORT, supra note 156, at 58–60. In Germany, 50% variation in single 
plant output was reduced to only 10% variation for 100 dispersed sites.  Ramp rates for solar 
output were also reduced by 90% for the 100 sites when aggregated compared to ramp rates 
for individual plants. 
 199. Id. at 64. 
 200. Id. at 62.  The WGA Report cites a study by CAISO demonstrating this 
relationship for July 2003, but significant increases in renewables penetration, together 
with other changes to the CAISO portfolio, are likely to alter this conclusion by 2020.  
See infra Part V. 
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and California; wind, wave and solar in Denmark) is a key element in 
these systems.  Geographic diversity alone is unlikely to yield the same 
level of benefits.201 
“By itself,” concludes the WGA, “geographic diversity is probably 
insufficient to justify new or upgraded transmission lines but it may be 
an additional benefit.  Regardless, the benefits of geographic diversity 
clearly support balancing authority area aggregation and greater cooperation 
across areas.”202  This conclusion highlights the complementary character of 
many of the WGA options: many of them are more valuable if others are 
simultaneously implemented. 
Geographic Diversity is broken into two alternatives in the option 
assessment: 
1. If using existing transmission (low to medium cost, low to medium 
benefit, medium timeframe). 
2. If new transmission needed (high cost, medium benefit, long timeframe). 
F.  Improve Reserves Management 
Power system reserves are those “quantities of generation or demand 
that are available as needed to maintain electric service reliability.”  The 
WGA Report distinguishes contingency reserves (“for unforeseen 
events, such as an unscheduled power outage”) from balancing reserves 
(“for day-to-day balancing of generation and demand”).203  Balancing 
reserves are either for regulation (to “balance the momentary fluctuations in 
generation and load and deviations from forecasts” through Automatic 
Generation Control [AGC] systems) or load-following (“used to respond 
to changes on a slower time scale—tens of minutes to hours” due to 
“expected imbalances as a result of predicted changes in near term load 
and generation”).204 
The cost of maintaining and operating such reserves—which generally 
must be increased with higher levels of renewables penetration to manage 
more variable generation—can be reduced through four management 
strategies: (1) reserve sharing; (2) dynamic calculation of reserve 
requirements; (3) contingency reserves for extreme wind drops; and (4) 
wind ramp rate limits or controls on variable generation with curtailment 
 201. WGA REPORT, supra note 156, at 62. 
 202. Id. at ES-8. 
 203. Id. at ES-9. 
 204. Id. at 68. 
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compensation.205  Reserve sharing “can reduce the individual reserve 
requirements of the system by averaging out short-term load and 
resource fluctuations across balancing authority areas.”206  Dynamic 
calculation of reserve requirements would shift from a system of static 
reserve requirements (i.e., reserve requirements that are independent of 
the specific conditions affecting the BA in a given hour) to one “based 
on factors such as the load forecast, the variable generation forecast, net 
load variability forecast, the confidence in forecasts, and possibly 
information on the expected behavior of conventional generation.”207  
Improved forecasting confidence is critical to deploying this strategy 
successfully.  This is another example of how most of the WGA options’ 
effectiveness can be enhanced by the implementation of one or more of 
the other WGA strategies. 
“There are situations in which the loss of wind generation is similar to 
the loss of conventional units,” states WGA, “such as when wind plants 
are tripped at their point of interconnection.”208  In these situations, “it 
may be desirable to assess whether large wind ramp events should be 
treated as contingencies [rather than as necessitating balancing reserves] 
because use of contingency reserves could reduce costs and increase 
reliability.”209  Treating these rare wind events as contingencies would 
shift the reserve requirement from balancing reserves to contingency 
reserves—which are generally less flexible and responsive and therefore 
less costly to maintain in reserve.  WGA cautions that this approach 
requires further analysis, however, before the reclassification could be 
implemented.210 
The most controversial policy option from the perspective of renewable 
generators is the strategy used by BPA that triggered its dispute with 
wind generators before FERC: controlling variable generation.  It is also 
a strategy that is very attractive to many BAs, because “[r]elatively 
modest limits on wind turbine operations could significantly reduce the 
need to hold balancing reserves.”211  One way to encourage such regulation 
would be to offer higher payments for variable generators who accept 
such limits—a version of the negative pricing approach advocated by 
 205. Id. at ES-9. 
 206. Id. at 69. 
 207. Id. at 70–71. 
 208. Id. at 72. 
 209. Id. at 71. 
 210. Id. at 71–72.  The ramifications of reclassifying reserve requirements as 
contingency rather than balancing depend on the generation mix and the degree of BA 
integration, so this BA-specific analysis may be required to determine if such a reclassification 
is appropriate.  Moreover, whether or not other WGA strategies are adopted will influence the 
reliability consequences of reclassifying reserve requirements. 
 211. Id. at 72. 
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wind generators in the BPA dispute.  But current “bilateral markets and 
transmission tariffs do not make distinctions based on these factors.”212  
Moreover, “supplying regulation from wind and solar generators would 
require the units to operate below full capacity to be able to ramp up, 
foregoing low-cost and clean generation.”213  The strategy therefore has 
some costs.  Wind already provides regulation service in Denmark, 
however, and ramp rate controls are in operation in Hawaii, Texas, Ireland, 
and Germany.214  Xcel is also adding AGC to wind plants to increase 
operator confidence and reduce wind curtailments.215 
The overall potential for some of these reserve management strategies 
ultimately depends on the degree of cooperation and coordination among 
the 37 BAs in the WECC.  NREL estimated that consolidation to just 
five BAs would yield annual operating cost savings of $1.7 billion with 
a 10% renewables penetration scenario.  Penetration to 30% wind and 
renewables would double reserve requirements, but “the presence of 
renewable resources on the system can free up conventional generators 
to provide up-reserves” so that “reserves required to accommodate wind 
and solar can be supplied by existing natural gas plants that are backed 
down.”216  The paradoxical result is that “net load variability increases” 
with 30% renewables, but “there was no need to commit additional 
reserves to cover variability resulting from increased wind and solar” 
generation.217  The NREL analysis assumes “full balancing authority 
coordination,” though, rather than 37 independent and uncoordinated 
BAs.218 
Reserves Management is broken into four alternatives in the option 
assessment: 
1. Reserves Sharing (low cost, low to medium benefit, short timeframe). 
2. Dynamic Calculation (low cost, low to medium benefit, short timeframe). 
3. Using Contingency Reserves for Wind Events (low to medium cost, low 
to medium benefit, short to medium timeframe). 
4. Controlling Variable Generation (assuming requirements are prospective) 
(low to medium cost, low to medium benefit, medium to long timeframe). 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 73. 
 215. Id. at 104. 
 216. Id. at 73. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
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G.  Retool Demand Response to Complement Variable Generation 
Improved energy efficiency and demand response (DR) or demand 
side management (DSM) are essential ingredients of an integrated electrical 
system with a high level of renewables penetration.  Improving DR as a 
complement to supply-side investments is also a cost-effective strategy 
for matching demand with supply.  FERC adopted Order No. 745 (Demand 
Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets) in 
2011 to encourage more effective DR,219 and it already plays a significant 
role in the PJM, ISO-NE, and ERCOT markets.220  The WGA Report 
highlights how DR can be tailored to improve integration of renewables 
while reducing integration costs compared to some supply-side or 
transmission investments.  “To realize significant integration benefits,” 
states WGA, “this must be done through either direct control of the load 
or pre-programmed responses to real-time prices.”221 
WGA differentiates the role played by DR when load is uncertain 
(where DR can be implemented to reduce peak load) from when supply 
is uncertain (and also more variable daily and throughout the year);222 in 
particular, some DR programs and technologies may be most useful 
because they can quickly increase demand to absorb “excess” generation 
from renewables and then store it for later use.  Examples include pilot 
programs by Mason County PUD No. 3 in Washington223 and BPA, 
where customers’ electric hot water heaters are controlled to consume 
electricity that is then converted to thermal energy by heating the 
water—which can then be used as thermal energy without impacts on 
the grid.  BPA is also testing space heating and cold storage systems “as 
distributed energy storage devices to provide load following (10- to 90-
minute load ramps both up and down)” to manage variable renewable 
generation on the system.224  Cold storage systems have also been proposed 
to accommodate morning solar ramps in California both to consume the 
excess solar generation, thereby reducing the need to ramp down other 
generators, and to reduce afternoon and early evening peak demand by 
releasing the cold storage during hot periods of normal air conditioning 
 219. Demand Response Compensation in Wholesale Organized Markets, 134 FERC 
¶ 61,187 (Mar. 15, 2011); see also Joel B. Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid?: 
FERC’s Authority Over Demand Response Compensation in Wholesale Electricity Markets, 4 
SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 69, 81 (2013). 
 220. WGA REPORT, supra note 156, at 75 (discussing ERCOT), 112 (discussing New 
England ISO and PJM). 
 221. Id. at ES-10. 
 222. Id. at 75. 
 223. Id. at 86. 
 224. Id. at 85. 
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demand.225  Other “proofs of concept” in the WGA Report include 
programs to balance French nuclear plants, Denmark’s EcoGrid Project, 
and ERCOT—which “already gets 50 percent of its spinning reserves 
from demand response.”226  ERCOT had 21 load resource deployments 
from 2006-2012 with 8.5% wind generation—15 of which were outside 
of the summer, and eight of those were between 8 p.m. and 8 a.m.227  
Similar reliance on DR in the WECC could reduce reserve requirements. 
Implementation of FERC Order No. 745 occurs in the context of new 
information, communication, and control technologies,228 all of which 
have the potential to transform both the technical and economic feasibility 
of widespread reliance on DR to address integration.229  WGA estimates 
that DR costs only 10-30% of pumped storage or compressed air storage,230 
but there is still debate over how much DR can be achieved through real-
time price signals versus direct control.231  Third-party aggregators may 
also play a prominent role under Order No. 745.232  One estimate of DR 
potential in the West shows over 13,000 MW of capacity in 2022 in a 
“High DSM Case” through a combination of: (1) interruptible load; (2) 
direct load control; (3) critical peak pricing; and (4) load as a capacity 
resource.233 
 225. Kelly Foley, Vote Solar, Presentation to the Environmental Law Conference at 
Yosemite, (Oct. 27, 2012). 
 226. WGA REPORT, supra note 156, at 85–86. 
 227. Id. at 75 n.283. 
 228. Id. at 75. 
 229. Joel Eisen, Edward Randolph, and Tom Brill have all used iPhone metaphors 
to describe the challenge of “smart grid” design today: like the iPhone, designers of the 
smart grid and associated markets do not know how future applications (apps) may 
evolve to take advantage of the underlying smart grid structure.  Joel B. Eisen, Professor, 
University of Richmond School of Law, Presentation to the Fourth Annual Climate & 
Energy Law Symposium (Nov. 9, 2012); Edward Randolph, Director, Energy Division, 
California Public Utilities Commission, Presentation to the Fourth Annual Climate & 
Energy Law Symposium (Nov. 9, 2012); Tom Brill, Director of Strategic Analysis, San 
Diego Gas & Electric, Presentation to the Fourth Annual Climate & Energy Law 
Symposium (Nov. 9, 2012). 
 230. WGA REPORT, supra note 156, at 76. 
 231. Id. at 81–82.  Both equity issues (for real-time pricing) and privacy issues (for 
direct control through so-called Smart Meters) are prominent as regulators explore DR 
options. 
 232. See Audrey Zibelman, Founder, President and CEO, Viridity Energy, Presentation 
to the Fourth Annual Climate & Energy Law Symposium (Nov. 9, 2012), available at 
http://www.sandiego.edu/law/news/webcasts/2012.php#cel-symposium-2012. 
 233. WGA REPORT, supra note 156, at 84. 
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Demand Response is broken into three alternatives in the option 
assessment (all have low to medium cost, low to medium benefit, short 
to medium timeframe): 
1. Discretionary Demand 
2. Interruptible Demand 
3. Distributed Energy Storage Appliances 
H.  Access Greater Flexibility in the Dispatch of                                  
Existing Generating Plants 
Flexibility in the non-renewables resource mix lowers integration costs.  
Individual generating plant flexibility is determined primarily by “[o]utput 
control range, ramp rate and accuracy—along with minimum run times, 
off times and startup times,”234 but those characteristics are already 
established for most of the existing generating fleet.  Therefore, the 
WGA report lists retrofitting existing generators as only the last priority 
among four strategies to increase flexibility: “First, establish generator 
scheduling rules that do not block access to the flexibility capability that 
already exists” (WGA strategy 1); “Second, perform balancing over as 
large a geographic area as possible” (WGA strategies 2, 3, 5 and 6); 
“Third, design flexibility into each new generator by selecting technologies 
that are more flexible” (WGA strategy 9).  Finally, retrofit existing 
generators “when this is practical and cost-effective.”235  “Among the 
barriers to retrofitting plants,” however, “are the fundamental limitations 
of the technology, uniqueness of each plant, cost and uncertain payback.  
The benefits of increasing existing plant flexibility may be comparatively 
small compared to other ways to reduce integration costs, such as larger 
balancing authorities and intra-hour scheduling.”236 
The WGA Report discusses a wide range of technology-specific 
opportunities for innovation (for new plants) and retrofitting (for existing 
plants) to improve flexibility.  Cycling wear and tear costs are often 
plant-specific, but generally highest for coal and nuclear power plants.237  
Natural gas supply scheduling is also a constraint for some natural gas-
fired plants.238  WGA states that in 2005 “thermal ramping capability 
exceed[ed] load-ramping requirements” for CAISO, PJM, and WAPA, 
but existing administrative rules limited operator access to that full 
flexibility.239  Dramatic increases in renewable generation since 2005, 
 234. Id. at 89. 
 235. Id. at ES-11. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 98. 
 238. Id. at 106. 
 239. Id. at 93. 
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together with other constraints on the operation of existing generators, 
may make this study less illustrative of actual conditions today.  CAISO 
is now dealing with strict existing air quality constraints on some fossil-
fuel facilities, the unexpected shut down of the San Onofre Nuclear 
Generating Station (SONGS) in 2012, and new state water quality 
regulations that will require either the retirement or repowering of 12,000 
MW of existing thermal generation by 2020.240  Approximately 80% of 
CAISO’s current load-following requirements are due to loads while 
only 20% is due to variable energy generation241—but the impact of 
variable generation on load-following demands will increase by 2020.242  
Therefore, it is critical that flexibility be valued and rewarded as the 
existing generator fleet transitions. 
The costs of cycling existing plants vary widely and are often plant-
specific; NREL is now modeling those costs in an effort to refine integration 
cost estimates for high-penetration renewables scenarios.243  Inclusion of 
any new lower cost base load generator, including non-renewable 
generators, in the resource mix can increase coal plant cycling as the 
most expensive units—which often have greater flexibility—are pushed 
out of the dispatch order.244  There is also a relationship between 
technological investments and operational practice.  The flexibility needs of 
the grid ultimately “depend on the institutional framework that is in 
place.  If the operational and market tools described earlier in [the WGA] 
report are further developed in the Western U.S., less physical flexibility 
will be needed” for integration.245 
Reliability of Existing Plants is broken into two alternatives in the 
option assessment: 
1. Minor Retrofits (low to medium cost, low to medium benefit, short to 
medium timeframe). 
2. Major Retrofits (medium to high cost, medium to high benefit, medium to 
high timeframe). 
  
 240. Rothleder, supra note 10. 
 241. WGA REPORT, supra note 156, at  94. 
 242. Rothleder, supra note 10. 
 243. WGA REPORT, supra note 156, at 101. 
 244. Id. at 100. 
 245. Id. at 102–03. 
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I.  Focus on Flexibility for New Generating Plants 
High levels of renewable penetration will require new non-renewable 
generating plants to have high levels of flexibility.  As the WGA Report 
notes, however, “[r]esource planning and procurement processes typically 
are not focused on flexible capability” for either renewables or non-
renewable generation.”246  Therefore, new institutional incentives must 
be established to ensure that new generating plants can provide the specific 
flexibility needed with high renewables penetration.  “New criteria and 
methods are needed to evaluate flexible capabilities of resource options” 
in procurement processes,247 because a utility may risk a disallowance 
from rate recovery if it pays more for more flexible resources than lower-
cost, but less flexible resources.248  As a consequence, more flexible 
resources may not be built or operated if not valued by either the market 
or regulators. 
There are three distinct operating conditions where integration requires 
flexibility: (1) high load with low renewables output; (2) low load with 
high renewables output; and (3) moment-to-moment variation.  New 
non-renewable generating plants must have the ability to follow net load 
rather than load to integrate renewable generation—and the types of 
flexibility needed to meet net load differ under each of those conditions.  
An MIT analysis of European strategies to achieve an 80% reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 determined that Europe will need 
more “flexible base-load” gas combined-cycle plants to operate with 
more cycling, but with annual capacity factors comparable to current gas 
combined-cycle plants.  “Together with more responsive demand, expanded 
transmission systems and larger balancing areas, more flexible generating 
resources are needed to optimize production and consumption” in the 
European analysis.  “Essentially what is needed is a portfolio of ‘flexible 
base-load’ supply resources capable of matching net load—with its shrinking 
share of round-the-clock demand—without compromising efficiency.”249 
WGA identifies four approaches to procuring flexible capacity: (1) 
utility resource planning and procurement; (2) forward capacity markets 
and auctions; (3) reserve adequacy requirement with regulatory backstop 
for planning and procurement; and (4) voluntary capacity markets and 
regional pooling.250  This mix of approaches reflects the hybrid regulatory 
structure: in some cases, traditional cost-of-service ratemaking or rate-
of-return regulation will create incentives for utilities to invest in flexible 
 246. Id. at ES-12. 
 247. Id. at 118. 
 248. Id. at 119. 
 249. Id. at 117. 
 250. Id. at 111–13. 
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generation with an assurance of recovering those investments; in other 
cases, market incentives must be created to provide the needed flexibility.  
Once again, the wide variety of institutional structures under which 
different BAs, generators, and load-serving entities operate creates a 
very complex setting for establishing consistent rules and incentives in 
the WECC.  Moreover, the variety of institutional structures increases 
the risk of gaming and market manipulation in the absence of strong 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.251 
Reliability for New Generating Plants is assessed as having low to 
high costs, medium to high benefits, and medium to long timeframe. 
J.  An Integrated Approach to Integration 
The WGA Report lays out an ambitious agenda that “will require an 
unprecedented level of cooperative action within the electric industry 
and between the industry and state, subregional and federal entities.”252  
Each of the individual strategies and sub-options has its own merits, but 
successfully meeting the challenge of integrating high penetration levels 
of renewable generation in the WECC requires deployment of the full 
portfolio of complementary strategies and options: 
While any of these actions may be put in place independently of one another, all 
are important elements of a regional approach to low-cost integration.  In 
addition, the extent to which any of these actions is undertaken, and therefore its 
costs and benefits, depends in part on the level of adoption of other actions.  
Further, many of these tools have important synergies (for example, forecasting, 
scheduling and reserves management).253 
The most effective way to minimize integration costs is with “greater 
cooperation among utilities, states, subregions and federal entities to 
share resources, loads and transmission in order to take advantage of 
least-cost strategies to integrate renewable resources.”254  Cooperation is 
already evident among many of the BAs in the WECC, but conflicts 
over integration cost allocation continue to impede progress at the level 
required.  FERC, state regulators, state legislatures, and possibly even 
Congress therefore now must act to “break down institutional barriers 
 251. Duane, supra note 19. 
 252. WGA REPORT, supra note 156, at ES-1. 
 253. Id. at 2. 
 254. Id. 
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that stand in the way of a less costly, more reliable and cleaner power 
system for residents and businesses.”255 
V.  IMPLEMENTING THE WGA STRATEGIES 
In this Part, we show that FERC has only partially implemented just 
three of the WGA’s nine recommendations through Orders No. 745 and 
764.  We then recommend specific policy initiatives by FERC, state 
regulators, state legislatures, and Congress to reduce the costs of integrating 
high levels of renewables into the electrical grid. 
A.  FERC Orders No. 745 and 764 Only Partially                                
Implement the WGA Strategies 
FERC Order No. 764 on the Integration of Variable Energy Resources 
(VER),256 which takes effect in June 2013, addresses only portions of 
two of the nine strategies recommended in the WGA report: (1) intra-
hourly (15-minute) transmission scheduling; and (2) requiring VER 
generators to provide meteorological and forced outage data for production 
forecasting through changes to the pro forma Large Generator 
Interconnection Agreement [LGIA].  The benefits of intra-hourly 
scheduling and better forecasting were discussed in Part IV.  But the 
Order would only partially implement the WGA’s recommendations in 
this regard—Strategy 1: Expand Sub-hourly Dispatch and Scheduling; 
Strategy 4: Improve Weather, Wind, and Solar Forecasting—because the 
Final Rule does not require sub-hourly dispatching and the LGIA 
modifications are prospective only (i.e., do not apply to existing VER 
generators).  Moreover, Order No. 764 does not require BAs to use the 
improved monitoring and reporting data through state-of-the-art 
forecasts to reduce VER generation forecast uncertainty for purposes of 
system operation.  Many of the benefits that WGA identified for these 
two strategies will therefore not be realized even after Order No. 764 is 
implemented. 
FERC’s action in adopting Order No. 745 in 2011 also supports WGA 
Strategy 7 (Retool Demand Response to Complement Variable Generation), 
so FERC has taken initial steps on three of the nine WGA recommendations. 
FERC took no action in Order No. 764 however, on ancillary services 
markets (which would support WGA Strategies 8 and 9), dynamic 
transfers (WGA Strategy 2), energy imbalance markets (WGA Strategy 
 255. Id. 
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4), consolidated balancing areas (WGA Strategies 2, 5, and 6), or cost 
recovery mechanisms for integration costs (i.e., determining how the 
costs of integrating VER generation will be allocated).  The latter 
issue—which affects how quickly and cost-effectively many of the other 
strategies could be implemented—remains the critical policy choice 
before FERC. 
Many of the other WGA Strategies have been partially implemented 
in specific BAs (e.g., CAISO) or are under active exploration by key 
stakeholders in the WECC.  Indeed, many of these stakeholders urged 
FERC to delay action on some of the most important policy options in 
order to allow those stakeholder studies and processes to continue 
without a “one size fits all” policy prescription from FERC.  Even the 
actions FERC did adopt in Order No. 764 were resisted by some parties: 
Southern California Edison (SCE), for example, urged FERC to allow 
three to five years to implement those changes. 
Such a timeframe may be necessary to implement some of the larger-
scale policy changes that WGA recommends; until FERC adopts an 
Order mandating such changes, however, the implementation clock will 
not begin ticking. FERC therefore must act soon if some of the policy 
changes will be implemented by the time California’s RPS requires 
California utilities to meet 33% of their annual load from renewables in 
2017-2020.  Yet the two strategies that are likely to yield the greatest 
benefits are also the most politically controversial: a region-wide Energy 
Imbalance Market (EIM) and consolidated BAs.  But they both have to 
be considered seriously—and, in our view, mandated by FERC, Congress, 
or both—if the total system costs of integrating high levels of renewable 
penetration are to be minimized.  Only by reducing those costs can 
allocation proceed equitably. 
There are intermediate steps that FERC can take before adopting such 
far-reaching policies.  In particular, FERC should authorize ancillary 
services markets and adopt broad policies that will assure subsequent 
FERC approval for RPS procurement mechanisms that value operational 
flexibility, technological diversity, and geographic diversity.  This will 
allow state RPSs and PPAs to compensate generators for providing the 
flexibility necessary to operate a reliable system with high levels of 
renewable penetration while also encouraging procurement policies that 
favor renewables that impose fewer integration costs on the system.  
Ancillary services markets are necessary to encourage short-term 
operational flexibility and responsiveness and to compensate generators 
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who operate in real-time markets through RTOs and ISOs.  Cost 
recovery assurance for long-term PPAs for renewables that are not 
“least-cost” on a per kWh basis—but whose pattern of output complements 
the system’s needs due to its timing, geographic location, or technological 
diversity—are necessary to encourage both technological innovation and 
compensation for long-term provision of these attributes by both 
renewable and non-renewable generators.  This will allow a BA like 
CAISO to ensure that it has the ramping and load-following flexibility it 
will need by 2017-2020 even if a region-wide EIM or BA consolidation 
has not been implemented by then.  And should FERC or Congress 
ultimately mandate a region-wide EIM or BA consolidation, the existence 
of ancillary services markets and flexible PPA standards will improve 
operations and lower costs. 
But ultimately, none of these measures will resolve the core issue at 
the heart of the BPA-wind dispute: who will pay the additional costs for 
ensuring reliable integration of renewables?  In particular, who should 
pay for the costs of integrating renewables in one BA (e.g., BPA) that 
are primarily serving customers in another BA (e.g., CAISO)?  A region-
wide EIM would start to address that issue by creating economic 
incentives associated with reducing energy imbalances among different 
BAs.  Consolidating BAs would be an even stronger way to internalize 
those costs, leading to more efficient dispatch decisions that consider all 
of the costs associated with the entire BA.  But the hybrid regulatory 
structure we work with today will continue to create very different 
incentives for market-based stakeholders compared to cost-of-service or 
rate-of-return stakeholders.  Each is compensated for the services it 
provides and recovers its costs and earns its profit in different ways, so 
each would benefit differently from different policies.  We therefore 
need to develop a hybrid set of policies to reflect the hybrid regulatory 
structure in the WECC. Those policies will not uniformly benefit every 
stakeholder but they are necessary to reduce the total system costs of a 
robust, resilient, reliable renewables-based grid. 
B.  Integration Cost Allocation is the Critical Policy Decision 
We stated in the Introduction that it is important to distinguish among 
four distinct, but interrelated, integration problems: (1) the technical 
challenges of integrating variability; (2) the economic costs of integrating 
variability; (3) the policy choice regarding distribution of integration 
costs; and (4) the legal framework for implementing that policy.  From a 
technical standpoint, variable energy resources clearly can be integrated 
if there are sufficient incentives (e.g., ancillary services markets, energy 
imbalance markets) and investments in the technology (e.g., to facilitate 
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dynamic transfers, balancing reserves).  The economic costs of integrating 
variability are also manageable if the suite of strategies recommended by 
the WGA is implemented.  Most importantly, those economic costs can 
be minimized if the geographic diversity associated with larger balancing 
authority areas (e.g., only five rather than the 37 BAs now in the WECC) 
is utilized to reduce net load variability so as to reduce the costs of 
contingency and balancing reserves.  If there is one clear lesson from the 
WGA Report, it is this: the “benefits of geographic diversity clearly 
support balancing authority area aggregation and greater cooperation 
across areas.”257 
Resolution of the cost allocation policy decision is therefore the 
critical impediment to development of a new institutional structure that 
will promote high levels of renewable generation.  As we have demonstrated, 
cost-of-service ratemaking and rate-of-return regulation internalize the 
costs of integrating both load and generating resources by minimizing 
total system costs; integration costs are neither calculated for nor assigned 
to individual generators when considering whether or not to add them to 
the resource mix.  Thus, internalization of those costs under the traditional 
rate recovery system addressed the cost allocation policy choice by 
default: integration costs were treated as system costs, so they were 
borne by all ratepayers across the system.  We believe the same policy 
principle should guide allocation of renewables integration costs going 
forward. 
We recognize, however, that our hybrid regulatory structure makes 
that difficult.  We therefore call for the development of more specific 
and explicit criteria to guide policies—and legal disputes under those 
policies, like the BPA-wind dispute—that will create the proper incentives 
for continuing investment in renewable generation and the transmission 
necessary to most cost-effectively develop renewable resources.  In some 
cases, the proper incentive is action by a state regulator to support utility 
investment in transmission or to assure rate recovery for a PPA that may 
be higher-cost but better-fit due to its flexibility or other operating 
characteristics (e.g., geographic diversity) for the contracted resources.  
In other cases, the proper incentive is action by FERC or an RTO or ISO 
to set locational marginal prices for transmission services to encourage 
investments in transmission to reduce congestion.  Both FERC and 
RTOs or ISOs can also structure ancillary services markets that will 
 257. WGA REPORT, supra note 156, at ES-8. 
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reward those resources that provide necessary operational flexibility; this 
is preferable to trying to impose integration costs on renewable generators 
that are unable to provide such flexibility.  The carrot will be more 
effective than the stick in reducing integration costs.258 
The legal framework for developing and implementing the policy 
choice to allocate integration costs across the system must be developed 
through four distinctive legal processes: (1) FERC rulemaking under its 
existing authority; (2) state regulators under their existing authority; (3) 
state legislatures to ensure that state regulators have the authority 
necessary to implement the WGA recommendations; and, in very limited 
cases, (4) Congressional action to amend FERC’s authority to implement 
those recommendations.  We believe that FERC has existing authority to 
establish ancillary services markets, facilitate dynamic transfers, establish 
energy imbalance markets, and to establish principles to guide future 
litigation over cost recovery mechanisms for integration costs (e.g., the 
BPA-wind dispute).  However, consolidating balancing authority areas—
the single WGA recommendation likely to yield the highest benefit in 
reduced integration costs—is probably beyond FERC’s authority and 
would require Congressional action.  It is also the most controversial 
action and could result in inequitable burdens for some existing BAs or 
states, so we believe it warrants careful legislative consideration by 
Congress.  We are hopeful that the Obama Administration could put 
forward proposed legislation on this issue and get Congressional support 
for such a change during its second term. 
But neither FERC nor the states should hold its breath awaiting 
Congressional action.  Instead, FERC should move forward by building 
on Orders No. 745 and 764 with Orders related to ancillary services 
markets, cost recovery for investments that facilitate dynamic transfers, 
and policy principles that will encourage provision of integration 
flexibility and allocation of integration costs as system costs.  FERC 
should then go even further and establish a region-wide EIM throughout 
the WECC.  Establishing an EIM that is carefully monitored and enforced 
to prevent possible market manipulation would strengthen operational 
ties between existing BAs and would help reduce political opposition to 
BA aggregation.  A regional EIM, together with the other WGA strategies, 
would help to create de facto integration even if Congress is unable to 
adopt legislation to consolidate BAs more formally into a more efficient 
set for renewables integration. 
 258. This principle applies to the BPA-wind dispute: incentives for wind curtailment— 
perhaps funded by California ratepayers, who are ultimately the consumers of the RECs 
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The existing grid and regulatory system were built and designed to 
accommodate one set of problems, but the Climate Change Era requires 
us to green the grid through high levels of renewable generation.259  
Neither the existing grid nor today’s hybrid regulatory structure is 
adequate to assure that we can do so at the least cost. We must therefore 
innovate institutionally in order to build the generation and transmission 
system of the future that is necessary for a robust, resilient, and reliable 
electricity system that comprises much more renewable generation.  
Otherwise, we will continue to have legal conflicts like the BPA-wind 
dispute—but they will detract from, rather than facilitate, further expansion 
of renewable generation.  FERC must make the critical policy choice of 
allocating integration costs as system costs and then adopt the policies to 

























 259. Duane, supra note 30. 
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